Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on

Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative
Government
Stephen L. Cartert

At one of his earliest press conferences [Franklin]Roosevelt
compared himself to the quarterback in a football game. The
quarterback knows what the next play will be, but beyond
that he cannot predict or plan too rigidly because "future
plays will depend on how the next one works."'
I shall argue that under the Constitution only our politicians
are entitled to the flexibility of waiting to see how one play works
before calling the next one. Our constitutional courts, on the other
hand-and our Supreme Court in particular-have a different role
in adjudication concerning the structure of government. Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's famous dictum,2 the courts in structural cases should act as referees, and their proper role in determining the legitimacy of an institutional innovation is rigid
enforcement of the rules. When they do less, when they defer to
congressional policy judgments about the way in which federal authority is most efficiently exercised, they are acting not as courts
but as participants in the legislative process.
Since the Roosevelt years the courts (and, more frequently,
the commentators), in their rush to legitimate the administrative
state spawned by the New Deal, have on occasion forgotten or chosen to ignore the distinction between these roles. But the distinction is important, especially when the Supreme Court performs
what Charles Black has called the "legitimating funct Professor of Law, Yale University. An earlier version of this article was presented to
the Law and Government Program of the University of Chicago Law School. In addition to
the comments made on that occasion, I have had the benefit of more extensive critiques
from Enola Aird, Bruce Ackerman, Geoffrey Miller, Roberta Romano, and Cass Sunstein.
Sushma Soni provided helpful research assistance. Some of the themes in this article (and
indeed, a few of the paragraphs) appeared earlier in Stephen L. Carter, Framers Lost in
Sentencing Case, Legal Times of Washington 21 (Jan 30, 1989).
Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 327 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).
2 See Johnson v United States, 333 US 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter dissenting) ("federal
judges are not referees at prize fights but functionaries of justice").
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tion"-assuring the citizenry that their government is indeed operating in accordance with the Constitution. I shall contend that
legitimating opinions that do not test new institutional forms
against the original design are entitled to less deference than legitimating opinions paying closer attention to constitutional text,
structure, and history. I shall further argue that two of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the constitutionality of the exercise of federal power through independent entities,
Morrison v Olson4 and Mistretta v United States,5 unfortunately
suffer from precisely this defect.
Finally, I shall agree with those theorists who suggest that the
duty of legislators to make independent constitutional assessments
never ceases; but I shall note in particular the possibility-indeed
the likelihood-that there will be occasions on which the Supreme
Court, rightly or wrongly, will hold a particular action to be within
the power of the federal government, and yet a legislator will be
left with the sense that the action is contrary to the spirit of the
Constitution. Such actions I refer to as constitutional improprieties, and I shall argue that even when the Court has ruled an act
constitutionally valid, it may nevertheless be constitutionally improper. In the continuing constitutional conversation among the
Court and its various constituencies, a refusal to act on the ground
of constitutional impropriety is an appropriate and potentially important tool for dialogic interchange.
The fundamental rights arena is readily mined for examples.
What is easily overlooked, however, is that structural constitutional law also leaves room for constitutional improprieties-and
constitutional dialogue. The Court's opinions in Mistretta and
Morrison may seem to legitimate certain aspects of administrative
governance, but because the Justices have not yet met the strongest arguments the other way, a sensitive legislator might yet decide
to consider the agencies constitutionally improper. And constitutionally improper legislation is as much to be avoided as legislation
that is plainly unconstitutional.
I.

MORRISON, MISTRETTA, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION

In recent years, commentators by the host have challenged the
constitutional authority of the federal government to vest legisla3 Charles L. Black Jr., The People and the Court 56-86 (Prentice-Hall, 1960).
108 S Ct 2597 (1988).
5 109 S Ct 647 (1989).
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tive or executive powers in agencies that are formally independent
of legislative or executive control.' According to these critics, the
rise of what has come to be called the administrative state is inconsistent with the separation of powers. Back at the dawn of the New
Deal, one corner of this position, the non-delegation doctrine, was
even pronounced as constitutional law.7 But the Supreme Court
that enunciated the doctrine, battered by political criticism and
perhaps sensitive to the needs of the nation, finally backed down."
Until recently, the New Deal cases were thought to have settled the matter. Evidently, they did not. Unconcerned that the Supreme Court ignores their views, the current critics have pressed
the many variations of the separation of powers argument with
mounting enthusiasm-and mounting success. Over the past decade and a half the Supreme Court has seemed quite hospitable to
arguments that particular institutional arrangements are unconstitutional because they run afoul of the Founders' design for the operation of the federal government. Separation of powers, as a judicially enforceable doctrine, seemed to be in the midst of a
comeback as dazzling as it was unexpected.
Just a few years ago, then, fans of this well-worn but durable
doctrine were celebrating a Supreme Court that at last seemed
ready to force a return to federal governance on the model developed by the Founders. The Congress, which for years had been establishing new institutions and agencies of governance without serious judicial challenge, was rocked back on its heels when the
Justices struck down in quick succession the legislative veto and
the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget law, holding that
both violated the original understanding on the separation of powers.9 In those and other cases, the Court admonished sternly that
6

See, for example, Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemak-

ing, 88 Yale L J 451 (1979); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 S Ct Rev 41;
and Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 Harv L Rev 105 (1988).
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States, 295 US 495 (1935); and Panama
Refining Co. v Ryan, 293 US 388 (1935).
1 The supposed "switch in time" that "saved nine" was NLRB v Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937), which gave President Roosevelt the broad reading of congressional commerce power that he wanted. The non-delegation doctrine was formally buried
seven years later in Yakus v United States, 321 US 414 (1944). For a discussion of the
"court-packing" plan that represented President Roosevelt's effort to force the Justices off
the sidelines and into the game, see Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy 187-235 (Random House, 1941). For a short and useful analysis of the jurisprudential changes wrought by the "switch in time," see Archibald Cox, Hughes Court (19301941), in Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, and Dennis J. Mahoney, eds, 2 Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution 933, 934-38 (MacMillan, 1986).
See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983); and Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986).
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considerations of policy and efficiency, even of pressing public necessity, are not sufficient justifications for altering the original
scheme.
For example, in INS v Chadha'° the Justices ruled that the
Congress lacked the power to delegate authority while retaining a
legislative veto over its exercise. Faced with the argument that administrative government would work more efficiently if the power
were recognized, the Justices issued a sharply originalist rebuff:
"[Ilt is crystal clear . . . that the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency."11 Similar language regarding the obligation
of the federal government to act in accord with the Founders' institutional design appears in other recent decisions. 2 It seemed for
a time that after decades of dithering, the Justices at last had
adopted (albeit narrowly) a consistent approach to separation of
powers cases. To be sure, the chosen approach was severely criticized as over-zealously originalist and formalistic,1 3 but the Court's
defenders responded that a bit of originalism in structural cases
was a good thing.' 4
15
Then, two terms ago, things changed. In MQrrison v Olson,'
the Court sustained, by a vote of 7 to 1, the law providing for the
appointment of independent counsels to investigate and prosecute
allegations of wrongdoing in the executive branch. The surprise
was not the result, but the Court's reasoning. The painstaking assessment of the original understanding (sometimes described, mistakenly in my view, as a "strict" separation of powers) that had
10462 US 919 (1983).
"' Id at 958-59.
12 See, for example, Bowsher, 478 US at 722 (government must heed original design
even when doing so "produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance"); Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 US 50, 73 (1982) (plurality opinion) (Congress cannot ignore original design "whenever it finds that course expedient"); and Buckley
v Valeo, 424 US 1, 134 (1976) (per curiam) (concerns about effectiveness "do not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work").
" See, for example, E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
Is So Abysmal, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 506, 515-18 (1989); Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev 343, 343 (1989); Philip B. Kurland, The
Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine"of Separationof Powers, 85 Mich L Rev 592, 592-93, 605-13
(1986); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L Rev 488, 496-502 (1987); and Cass R.
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv L Rev 421, 493-96 (1987).
1" See, for example, Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution
and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separationof Powers, 1987 BYU L Rev 719, 778-800;
Harold J. Krent, Separatingthe Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 Va L
Rev 1253, 1261-72 (1988); and Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 S Ct Rev at 52-58 (cited
in note 6).
15 108 S Ct 2597 (1988).
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dominated separation of powers jurisprudence in recent years was
conspicuous by its absence. The Justices instead deferred to the
congressional judgment that independence was necessary to facilitate investigation and prosecution of executive miscreants.
Next, in the middle of the 1988-89 term, the notion that separation of powers disputes should be governed by close attention to
the text, structure, and history of the Constitution received perhaps its most stunning setback. In Mistretta v United States's the
Supreme Court (over a blistering dissent from Justice Scalia) held
that the Congress may constitute an independent agency and grant
it the authority to bind federal judges to the sentencing ranges
that the agency considers appropriate for various offenses.
As Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out, the majority opinion
in Mistretta "is internally inconsistent in its use of constitutional
history," relying on a bit of history (although less than Chemerinsky implies) in resolving the separation of powers question, but
none at all on the question of delegation of legislative authority-the more difficult of the two. 17 But the methodology is only
part of the problem. The implications of Mistretta are also troubling, for if the Congress may create an agency with the powers of
the Sentencing Commission, it is hard to envision one that would
be forbidden.
Taken together, Mistretta and Morrison should have rudely
awakened observers of the Supreme Court whom the tantalizingly
consistent run of recent decisions had lulled into supposing that
the Justices had finally sorted out the separation of powers. For
Mistretta, if it did nothing else, certainly proved that Morrison
was no fluke.' In both cases, the congressional policy judgment
was what mattered most. in neither case did the Court deem it
necessary to undertake an extensive investigation of the views of
the Founders on the separation of powers. And, in both cases, the
establishment of an agency beyond the direct control of any
16109

S Ct 647 (1989).

17 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing

Constitution, 103 Harv L Rev 43, 53 (1989). Chemerinsky adds that because "the delegation
issue was considered at the Constitutional Convention," the reader "is left with the impression that the Court is originalist only when it justifies the result that the Court wants." Id.
For reasons I will make clear below, the form of originalism that I prescribe pays little
attention to Madison's notes on the convention. My interest in ratification and popular debate rather than the confidential deliberations on drafting and creation is the principal reason for my reference to the "Founders" rather than the "Framers."
18 Chemerinsky is of the view that the Rehnquist Court's judicial philosophy is largely
one of deference to the majoritarian branches, see id at 56-59, 74-97, which would help
explain the methodology of Morrison and Mistretta.
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branch specified in the Constitution received a ringing endorsement from the Court.
So, while the vision of a judicially-enforced separation of powers may not quite be down for the count, it is certainly sagging on
the ropes. To be sure, administrative government was already wellestablished when Morrison and Mistretta came along. One may
trace its development all the way back to the "Decision of 1789,"
and the rich and lively congressional debate on removal of the
Treasury Secretary which involved, among other things, the question whether the public funds ought to be placed into the hands of
an individual or agency beyond political control. 19 Or, if one prefers to seek judicial provenance, one need look no further than McCulloch v Maryland, ° the case in which Chief Justice Marshall, in
ringing and decisive terms, destroyed forever the myth that the
federal government's powers under Article I, Section 8, were restricted rather than enhanced by the writtenness of the
Constitution.
In practical terms, however, judicial approval of modern administrative government began in 1935, when the Supreme Court
decided in Humphrey's Executor v United States2' that the Congress may create agencies beyond the direction of either the executive or legislative branches and grant to those agencies the author'22
ity to act "in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.
As scores of critics have pointed out in the ensuing fifty-five years,
the Court in Humphrey's Executor neglected to explain precisely

1'1 Annals of Congress 400-12, 616-32, 636-40 (1789). What has come to be called the
Decision of 1789 was the outcome of a heated debate in the First Congress over whether the
Treasury Department should be under legislative rather than executive control. See Edward
S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 86-89 (NYU, 4th ed 1957); and Joseph P.
Harris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate 30-33 (U Cal, 1953). Louis Fisher has gone so
far as to argue that the actual decision was ambiguous, and that in the early years of the
republic, the Treasury might have enjoyed a special status. See Louis Fisher, President and
Congress: Power and Policy 86-89 (Free Press, 1972). One must be cautious, however, about
making too much of the Decision of 1789. The deliberations of the First Congress are not
necessarily reliable guides to a shared original understanding, because even the drafters and
ratifiers were practical politicians, as willing as anyone else to twist and distort the new
Constitution in pursuit of a political end. Besides, the ultimate decision went in the other
direction; that is, against independence for the Treasury. But even had the First Congress
clearly established an independent Treasury, the Treasury might in any case hold a special
constitutional status: It is the only department explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. See
US Const, Art I, § 9, cl 7. For an overview of the rise of administrative government during
the past century, see Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
Stan L Rev 1189 (1986).
20 17 US 316 (1819).
21
22

295 US 602 (1935).
Id at 628.
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what aspect of the Constitution granted the power to create independent entities of this kind.2 3 Nor have the Justices troubled to
do so in any subsequent opinion. Moreover, Humphrey's Executor
24
at least limited and might have overruled Myers v United States,
the only decision in which the Justices actually sifted through the
views of the Founders on the ability of the Congress to establish
entities exercising executive authority but independent of executive control.25
Nevertheless, most constitutional scholars, and nearly all
courts, treat the matter as settled law. In a positivist sense it certainly is, for the highest court in the land shows every sign of satisfaction with a doctrine that permits the Congress and the President to experiment with institutional forms never contemplated by
the Founders and possibly quite foreign to their political science.
The difficulty is that while we have a positivist answer to the question of constitutionality, we have no authoritative assessment of
the historical evidence.
So although one might be tempted to say in the wake of Morrison, and even more so in the wake of Mistretta, that the constitutional status of the administrative state is no longer in question,
that is too broad and unthinkingly positivist a construction of the
relationship between law and interpretation. Better, surely, to
spend a moment as a legal realist, and to say simply that it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court will at any time in the near future strike down as unconstitutional any of the major aspects of
the administrative state-in particular, the assignment of legislative or executive authority to agencies beyond direct political supervision. That conclusion tells what the law is, in the sense of
what the Supreme Court has said; it does not tell what the law
ought to be, and it does not say anything at all about "constitutional status."
This distinction matters. Strong arguments are still available
that independent agencies have the status of constitutional outlaws, something contrary to the evident constitutional plan. To say
that strong arguments are available is not to say that the arguments must convince, and there are of course clever arguments the
other way. By tradition, we look to the Supreme Court to resolve
these conflicts. But in our relentlessly positivist public debate, we
2 See, for example, Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at 128 (cited in note 6).
2 272 US 52 (1926).
2 On whether Myers has been overruled sub silentio, see Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at

129-34 (cited in note 6).
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all too often act as though what matters most is the Court's interpretive authority; once the Court has announced a constitutional
interpretation, the matter is considered settled.2 6
But the Court also serves a dialogic function: it answers questions, and sometimes puts questions of its own. The difficulty with
the Supreme Court's recent opinions on the independence of government entities (and the difficulty with the old opinions, too) is
that they simply do not answer most of the questions raised by
skeptics of agency independence. When the Supreme Court fails to
engage in dialogue, its view prevails (if at all) only because of our
tradition of finality, not because the Justices have convinced their
critics. In Morrison and Mistretta, they haven't even tried.
II. THE DE-EVOLUTIONARY TRADITION
The study of separation of powers, moribund through most of
the rights-happy seventies, has recently undergone a resurgence.
The flowering of the separation of powers cases ought to be unsurprising in our era of divided government, with the executive and
legislative powers consistently in the hands of different political
parties. With the President and the Congress more likely to do
battle, and with our peculiar habit of settling political differences
through litigation, separation of powers cases are sure to arise
more often than they once did. Besides, the rising generation of
scholars seems to harbor an ingrained mistrust of concentrated
power, much as the Founders did, and therefore may be seeking a
richer understanding of the manner in which the awesome might of
the federal government can be reined in. Whatever the reason, attention to what might be called the Political Constitution-the
clauses establishing the structure and function of the federal government-has grown increasingly popular.
The Supreme Court, perhaps unsurprisingly, has shown little
interest in the fascinating (and occasionally strident) academic debate over the best approach to adjudication under those clauses.
On the contrary, separation of powers cases too often seem to be
decided on the basis of either a cramped originalism that assumes

26

Compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 Stan L Rev 739, 755-58

(1982).
2 I introduced my concept of the Political Constitution in Stephen L. Carter, Constitu-

tional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A PreliminaryDefense of an Imperfect
Muddle, 94 Yale L J 821, 847-70 (1985). See also Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 778-800 (cited
in note 14); and Stephen L. Carter, The Right Questions in the Creationof Constitutional
Meaning, 66 BU L Rev 71, 72-81 (1986).
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that a glance at the sacred text of Madison's notes will resolve all
questions, or a policy analysis that could have been written by a
congressional staffer.
This failure of the Court to produce a coherent theory is particularly ironic when placed alongside the reasonably consistent
doctrines and workable tests that the Justices have developed to
govern adjudication under such open-ended provisions as the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. True, the doctrines have been
challenged and their application to particular cases questioned, but
for those who believe in judicial process, the simple fact of taking
the Constitution seriously-which, in my view, the entire Court
struggles to do when individual rights are at issue-is reassuring.
When facing structural problems in general, however, and separation of powers questions in particular, the Justices sometimes seem
to consider the possibility of constitutionalism almost as an
afterthought.
This approach might have matters exactly backward. Perhaps
constitutionalism is more important in structural cases than in
cases about rights. Perhaps it is important to have clear, determinate answers about the structure of government so that those who
want to change the way the world works understand where the
power lies. What might be needed is a constitutional "safe harbor,"
a part of constitutional governance that is shielded from the winds
of change that blow constantly through society.2 s A judiciary that
draws its authority from the construction of a relatively determinate interpretation of the structural provisions of Article III and
Article VI could do much worse than insist on similarly determinate guidance for the other branches of the federal government. If
all provisions of the Constitution are equally fluid, if relatively determinate results are no more possible in reading the Presentment
Clause than in reading the Equal Protection Clause, then all of
governance is essentially left up for grabs, and it becomes difficult
to defend the claim that constitutionalism limits in any coherent
sense the structure and operations of the government of the
United States. In the words of Richard Epstein, "The importance
of a fixed constitutional framework and stable institutional arrangements is necessarily lost once the framework that was
designed to place a limit upon politics becomes the central subject
of the politics it was designed to limit."2 9 If the structural provi2 See Carter, 94 Yale L J at 864-65 (cited in note 27).
29 Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U Chi L Rev

703, 736 (1984). In borrowing Epstein's useful language to describe a problem under the
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sions of the Constitution evolve freely as the felt political needs of
the country change, then we might as well say that the federal government controls the Constitution rather than, as we teach schoolchildren, the other way around.
Something like this, I think, is what Joseph Raz had in mind
when he wrote in The Morality of Freedom:
Federal states distinguish between ordinary political action,
which takes place within the existing framework of political
institutions, and political action which changes that very
framework. They tend to endorse special procedures for the
second, procedures which have a built-in conservative bias in
them, that is a bias which make[s] constitutional changes
more difficult to effect than ordinary political action."
The entire point of a constitution that governs structure is to enable government to function while restraining the ability of government to restructure itself. I have elsewhere referred to the effort to use the vision of the Founders to effect that restraint in
separation of powers cases as the de-evolutionary tradition. 1
Legend has it that the great chess genius Rudolf Spielmann
was once asked why he always opened his games with the same
move. Spielmann replied, "Because I never make a mistake in the
opening!" This was of course an exaggeration; Spielmann did not
always open with the same move, and when he did, he did not always win. But he usually opened with the same move, and he usually won. In any event, the philosophy underlying his answer ought
to intrigue constitutional theorists. Spielmann was insisting, in a
positive rather than normative sense, that there is a single best
move in every position that might occur on the board, including
the opening position with the thirty-two pieces resting on their initial squares.
Similarly, I would argue (but now in a normative sense) that
there is a single best interpretive move when a court is called upon
to apply the structural clauses of the Political Constitution. The
Political Constitution, after all, is different from what might be
called the Natural Law Constitution, in which the rights of indi-

Political Constitution, I should not be read as necessarily endorsing his analysis of the Contracts Clause of Article I, which, in his view, the Supreme Court disregarded in Home Bldg
& Loan Ass'n v Blaisdell, 290 US 398 (1934). Id at 735-38.
" Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 259 (Clarendon, 1986).
" See generally Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev 719 (cited in note 14).
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viduals are set forth.3 2 Peter Strauss has written that "[o]ne scanning the Constitution for a sense of the overall structure of the
federal government is immediately struck by its silences,"3' but I
fear that he has matters backward. The 1787 Constitution reflects
the enormous energy that the Founders expended on designing the
structure of the federal government; in the words of John Ely, "the
original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, dedicated to concerns of process and structure."34 The
Political Constitution consists of relatively determinate clauses
phrased by their authors with highly specific referents in mind.
The clause requiring that the President be thirty-five years of age,
for example, while not, perhaps, utterly unambiguous,3 5 hardly
poses the same interpretive difficulties as the Equal Protection
Clause. As Frederick Schauer has noted, moreover, the American
government functions within these structural clauses without the
need for constant resort to judicial interpretation; people seem to
agree on what most of them mean.3 6 Or rather, as my junior high
school English teacher used to say, people seem to agree on how
they mean: they mean what-the Founders thought they meant.
The obvious response to this proposition is to dismiss it, even
if accurate, as irrelevant: Why should a constitutional interpreter
care what (or how) the American public believes the structural
clauses of the Political Constitution mean? The answer is that the
authoritative constitutional interpreter-the interpreter who
claims the power to frustrate the combined will of a majority of the
people's legislative representatives and the elected chief executive-should care because an interpretation that disregards this
popular constitutional hermeneutic expectation lacks legitimacy in
a liberal democratic polity. And the interpreter who does care
about the constitutional vision of the demos, the Court's public,
11My choice of terminology is influenced in part by Suzanna Sherry's provocative article, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127 (1987).
13 Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 597.
"' John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 92 (Harvard, 1980). See also H. Jefferson
Powell, How Does the Constitution Structure Government?, in Burke Marshall, ed, A
Workable Government: The Constitution After 200 Years 13 (W.W. Norton, 1987). Although my discussion here is only of the system of checks and balances within the federal
government, I recognize that the Founders designed checks to run vertically as well as horizontally. For a provocative assessment of the original vision of the roles of the state and
federal sovereignties in checking one another, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale L J 1425 (1987).
" See Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S Cal L Rev 683, 686-87 (1985).
10 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399, 408-14 (1985).
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should choose to adjudicate cases under the structural provisions
of the Political Constitution in accord with the de-evolutionary
tradition.
I understand that my assertion is a controversial one, but this
is not the place for a lengthy elucidation of the reasons for my
conclusion that only de-evolutionary review can carry legitimating
force; 37 for the curious reader, I cite the relevant sources in the
margin.3 8 It might, however, be appropriate to recapitulate the argument here, albeit briefly and obliquely.
I begin with the proposition that much of the narrative significance of American constitutionalism flows from a mythos that venerates the Founders and assumes that our governmental institutions are contiguous with theirs, that we are in effect operating in
accordance with the rules they laid down. 9 Nothing in the argument turns on the truth of this assumption. Judges and constitutional theorists know, or think they do, that the mythos is false:
that the governance of the late twentieth century post-industrial
American state bears little resemblance to the agrarian "democracy" that the Founders envisioned. But the irrelevance of the
Founders' political science to our era is a proposition to be argued,
not assumed; and even should the wisdom of the Founders turn
out to be nonsense when translated to our era, the question of who
should hold the power to abandon it sits uneasily and unanswered

31 Erwin Chemerinsky, who has done me the complement of writing a very thoughtful
response to my views, see Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor
Carter'sApproach to JudicialReview, 66 BU L Rev 47 (1986), and has subsequently incorporated some of the same material in a fine book, see Interpreting the Constitution77-80
(Praeger, 1987), has listed and rebutted what he says are the three reasons why I support
"originalism" in structural adjudication. Quite apart from the fact that I am not sure that
the unmodified word "originalism" captures the form of review that I have in mind, I fear
that none of the three reasons that Professor Chemerinsky cites are the reasons I advocate
the approach I do. (If anything in my earlier work has given the wrong impression, such was
not my intention).
11 The justification for de-evolution, although I had not yet hit upon the name, was first
set out in Carter, 94 Yale L J at 853-70 (cited in note 27). A more formal presentation
appears in Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 778-800 (cited in note 14). A somewhat sharper and
more refined vision is sketched in Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at 118-28 (cited in note 6).
31 My colleague Paul Kahn calls this the myth of intertemporal identity. Paul W. Kahn,
Reason and Will in the Originsof American Constitutionalism,98 Yale L J 449, 508 (1989).
I recognize, of course, certain obvious parallels between a form of originalism that glorifies
the Philadelphia event and ancestor-worship. See Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 738-39 (cited
in note 15). But I emphatically do not base my advocacy of de-evolutionary review on any
form of veneration of the Founders. The Founders, by and large, supported or tolerated
chattel slavery, the oppression of women, and the exclusion of the poor from the franchise.
For more on this, see Stephen L. Carter, The Role of the Courts in Seperation of Powers
Disputes, - Wash U L Q - (forthcoming, 1990).
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on the interpreter's shoulder. For whatever smart theorists may
know, the people may yet believe that the continuity exists, and
may even place their allegiance-let us say, their consent-on that
ground.
Perhaps, as critics often charge, the American political system
really contains no functional equivalent of the consent of the governed, whether actual or tacit. But if political obligation is willed
at all, it is surely willed against the background of the role that our
myths about the Founding play in popular attitudes about American Government. The Founders, in American political iconography, are the larger-than-life figures who met at Philadelphia at the
dawn of the nation's history and joined in the most successful act
of constitutional creation the world has ever known.40 As Sanford
Levinson has pointed out, the Philadelphia Convention "is most
certainly, and profoundly, an event in addition to a text.""'
Whether treated as text or event, says Levinson, "'Philadelphia'
itself gains meaning only from being placed within a narrative
structure, itself of civil religious dimension."4' 2
On this point, it is appropriate to consider Raz once more:
"[O]ne may distinguish in every country between the basic political culture of that country, and its more detailed and transient arrangements. '43 The basic political culture of the United States, I
would argue, rests in large measure on both the Philadelphia event
and the idea that we are governed in accordance with the framework that it spawned. 44 The basic culture excludes particular political initiatives. The distinction, as Raz says, "is one of degree, and
' But the distinction is
is not susceptible to precise description."45
there, and contemporary theorists often miss it. For example,
Bruce Ackerman in his Storrs Lectures suggests that the American
people, in the crucial constitutional moment of the 1936 elections,
essentially amended the Constitution to strike the Philadelphia
structure and replace it with the structure of the New Deal. 41 Pos40 Much of this argument is paraphrased from Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at 120 (cited in
note 6). See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1515-18 (1988).
" Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalFaith 134 (Princeton, 1988).
42 Id.
4' Raz, Morality of Freedom at 259 (cited in note 30).
4' In addition to Sanford Levinson's book cited in note 41, a good account of the continuing significance of the Philadelphia event in American political iconography is Michael
Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself. The Constitution in American Culture
(Knopf, 1986).
" Raz, Morality of Freedom at 259 (cited in note 30).
4' Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,93 Yale L J
1013, 1054-57 (1984). Ackerman considers the constitutional document a representation,
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sibly so-but I am not at all sure that the public veneration of the
founding of modern administrative government matches the awe
that attaches to Philadelphia as an event.
Still, Ackerman is right to focus his analytical attention on
The People-the demos. Because even if the public has no idea
what is in the Constitution, the people evidently believe that the
American government, the Republic to which schoolchildren daily
pledge allegiance, is in its basic structure the one that the Foun-

built up by semiosis (mimesis is obviously not possible) to signify the underlying constitutional politics that led to its creation. But, he argues, precisely because of the document's
semiotic character, it is the fundamental choices that the Constitution signifies, and not the
document itself, that are entitled to binding authority. His central claim is that since it is
the resolution of a struggle of constitutional magnitude that carries binding force, the constitutional interpreter ought to be indifferent as to whether the resolution is signified in a
document or in some other form. In Ackerman's view, for example, the 1936 elections signify
the resolution of a constitutional struggle over the breadth (and perhaps the structure) of
government regulatory authority, a political moment of constitutive dimensions, and one
that the interpreter should not trivialize or ignore simply because it is not signified by a
document.
The constitutional document, then, is an artifact, an essentially arbitrary choice among
possible signs to signify the underlying understanding. By reasoning in this fashion, Ackerman might seem to be following a basic rule of semiology, nicely put by Robert Scholes:
"[I]n all (or nearly all) signs the sound-image is in no way dictated by the concept." Robert
Scholes, Structuralism in Literature:An Introduction 15 (Yale, 1974). See also Umberto
Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Indiana U, 1976). Indeed, Ackerman's approach might seem on
its face to meld the political theoretic ideal of popular consent with the linguistic and psychological evidence that people remember meaning (the signified, the constitutional understanding) with far greater accuracy than they remember the text (the signifier, the constitutional document). See E.D. Hirsch, The Philosophy of Composition 122-29 (U Chicago,
1977) (summarizing research).
The trouble is that the arbitrariness of the sign does not necessarily imply the irrelevance of the sign. To quote Scholes once more:
The connection between sound and concept is arbitrary with respect to nature, of
course, but not to culture. We who grow up in English must call a tree a tree if we wish
to be understood. It is possible to be offended by this state of affairs, to see in it an
existential absurdity, but this would be an un-Saussurean and unstructuralistic response. The arbitrariness of the sign in no way need imply the arbitrariness of the
concept or its adequacy as an image of reality.
Scholes, Structuralism in Literature at 16. This, indeed, is the point of semiology: placed
within their cultural context, the signs do matter. One sign is not just as good as another,
simply because both are used to signify the same concept. So even if Ackerman is correct
(which I do not concede) in insisting that the level of constitutional politics during the New
Deal was comparable to the level of constitutional politics during the Founding, nothing
about the universe of acceptable signs follows therefrom. Especially when one is concerned
with the consent of real people to a real government structure, one wants to know the symbols-the signs-that matter to them. The American public has always had a special reverence for the Founders and the Founding, and the Constitution is a symbol of our continuity
with the Founding Generation. See Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself (cited in
note 44). Ackerman's argument works only if as a matter of American popular political iconography, the New Deal as a symbol of permanent structuralchange rivals the Founding as
a symbol of the same thing, an assertion distantly plausible but on the whole unpersuasive.

1990]

Constitutional Improprieties

ders designed. It should matter little to the interpreter whether the
people are right or wrong in assuming that the structure of our
government has been handed on by past generations substantially
continuous with our own; it should matter still less whether the
interpreter thinks that she knows better, for legitimacy in a democratic polity begins with the ruler's recognition that the people
need not be smart in order to matter.4 7
The constitutional vision of the demos, then, supposes that
our government is the one that the Founders handed down. The
interpreter who is guided by the popular imagination must select
an interpretive method that exerts pressure (no perfect fit is possible) on the federal government to confine itself to a set of institutional arrangements substantially continuous with the original design of the Founders whom the popular imagination extols. This is
what I mean by the de-evolutionary tradition, and the de-evolutionary interpreter must do the hard work of ascertaining the postulates that undergird the clauses establishing the government's
structure. The best clue to those postulates is the text and the
structure that it fairly implies; but where these fail, conscious resort ought to be had to the history of the period of drafting and
ratification. At the same time, the interpreter must never forget
the goal-the discovery of the underlying postulates-and must
never forget that interpretation is an imaginative and creative
task, not a purely or mostly mechanical one. There is no hierarchy
of meanings: text over structure, structure over history, or the like.
On the contrary, the interpretive task is to meld the text, structure, and history-including the deep and rich political science of
the Founding Generation-into a coherent whole, by immersion in
the intellectual currents of the Founding Generation. Then, the interpreter must take this more profound understanding of the
Founding Era and use it as a basis for analyzing whatever structural question might be in issue. For only then, at the end of all of
this hard work, can the interpreter say to the parties and to her
public, "In order to render our institutions substantially continuous with the arrangements envisioned by the Founders, the thing
that we must do (or must not do) is this."
That much, and no more, is the task of the de-evolutionary
interpreter. Considerations of expediency, desirability, or efficiency
are beside the point; what matters is hardheaded, concrete reasoning about the constitutional document itself, the structure of gov47

This paragraph is adapted from Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at 120-21 (cited in note 6).
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ernment that it creates, and the political science underlying that
structure. The question for a court reviewing, say, the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, would not be "Is this a good
idea or not?" or "Does this maintain some balance of power or
not?" but "Is this consistent with the vision of the Founders or
not?"
The method that I propose for resolving cases under the Political Constitution will burden our judges, because it will often require much more from a court considering a structural question
than the swift, almost mechanical application of a phrase or two
from Madison's notes and a paragraph from The Federalist that
too often counts as settling "the intent of the Framers." The temptation to limit the search is plain, and the rationale not inconsiderable. The Framing, at least, was a discrete event. True, many of
the sources, especially Madison's notes, cannot reliably do all that
many de-evolutionists might ask.4 8 But the records, even if thin
and of questionable reliability, are accessible and describe a debate
that might at some points have occurred roughly as written. Ratification, on the other hand, was a traumatic, nationwide event, one
that sparked strong, sometimes ugly debates in every corner of the
young republic. Tracking down the shared understanding of the ratifiers-not only their precise imaginings, but the postulates of
good government underlying them-is not an easy task.
But the burden must be borne; good judging will at times be
arduous. And it was the public deliberation on ratification, not the
secret argument over drafting, that created constitutional government. So an interpreter seriously concerned about the original understanding must dip into a history considerably larger (but also
richer) than the skimpy accounts of the debate at Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787.
Still, quite apart from doubts about the reliability of the
sources, doing what I suggest might sometimes turn out to be impossible; sometimes the de-evolutionist judge will simply be unable
"' For example, James Madison could not possibly have recorded more than a fraction
of what occurred at the Convention, and it would be a terrible analytic error to assume that
what he did record is a full account simply because it has survived. See James H. Hutson,
The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex L Rev
1, 33-35 (1986). In any event, Madison's notes were unavailable to the ratifiers, who actually
turned the work of the Convention into fundamental law. See id at 2; and Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 BU L Rev 204, 214-17 (1980). It is
difficult to see why what amounts to a secret legislative history is entitled to probative value
on the question of the original understanding of the lawgivers themselves. For a general
discussion of these and related problems, see Carter, 102 Harv L Rev at 122-25 (cited in
note 6).
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to discover any textual or historical evidence bearing on the question at issue. In such a case, for reasons beside the point of the
current paper, it is appropriate for the court to abstain, to permit
the other branches to fight the matter out, by declaring the question to be a political one.4"
Judicial review in the de-evolutionary tradition should be distinguished from evolutionary review, through which the courts per-

mit the other branches of the federal government to work out fresh
institutional arrangements, quite unlike those contemplated at the
Founding, in order to meet the fresh problems of a different era.0
Bowsher v Synar51 and INS v Chadha 2 in which the Supreme
Court struck down, respectively, the automatic sequestration provisions of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the legislative veto, exemplify the de-evolutionary tradition, because in each case, the Jus-

"' See Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996, 1002 (1979) (plurality opinion). In the sometimes overly legalistic emphasis on asking which branch "really" holds a particular power,
scholars (and, lately, politicians) too often overlook the fact that the Constitution creates a
system of checks and balances, and that the Founders' vision encompassed the use by each
of the political branches of all of its powers in battle with the others. So, for example, if the
President seeks to impound money appropriated by the Congress, one option is litigation;
but another is for the Congress to refuse to appropriate money desired by the President for
some entirely different purpose. For rare scholarly recognitions of this possibility, see, for
example, Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 Hastings Const L Q 13, 15-16 (1974); and Peter M. Shane, The Separation of
Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees", 30 Wm & Mary L Rev
375, 382-86 (1989). See generally Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 800-08 (cited in note 14).
50For a detailed discussion of the evolutionary tradition, see Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev
at 722-35 (cited in note 14). For an assessment of its dangers, see id at 744-52. I recognize of
course that in the absence of some institutional evolution away from the original design, the
United States government would hardly be the powerful entity that it is today. In his comparison of the American and English constitutions, Richard Kay has put the point this way:
If the experience in the United States provides any guide, the answer must be that
the rules themselves (meaning the limitations the rulemaker intended to establish)
play a subordinate part in the formulation of constitutional limits, a part which diminishes as the time of the rules' enactment becomes more remote. Certainly, many of the
best-known judgments of the United States Supreme Court-those which, arguably,
have had the most significant effect on the operation of government-cannot comfortably be justified as the mere vindication of decisions already explicit or implicit in the
Constitution as amended.
Richard S. Kay, Substance and Structure as ConstitutionalProtections:Centennial Comparisons, Public Law 428, 436 (Autumn, 1989). There is a distinction, however, between
evolution in the objects of regulation and evolution in the manner of regulation. The first is
an inevitable concomitant of societal complexity, and it is difficult to believe that the Founders did not envision it. The second is a reflection of an impatience with a legitimating
structure of balanced and separated powers, and its abandonment, for reasons discussed in
the text, weakens the government's claim of legitimacy by obscuring the source of its
authority.
51478 US 714 (1986).
5- 462 US 919 (1983).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:357

tices expressly rejected arguments that the particular structural
innovation in question was justified on grounds of public policy or
necessity. Morrison and Mistretta provide recent examples of evolutionary review.
My preference for de-evolutionary review should not be taken
to suggest that I imagine that a text, even a legal text, possesses a
final, inherent, and correct meaning. On this point, somewhat to
my surprise, I find myself concurring with the semioticians and
their close cousins, the deconstructionists, who deny, albeit for
somewhat different reasons, the possibility that a text possesses a
single reading.5 3 Reading is a function of context; it is impossible
to answer the question "What does this text mean?" until the interpreter first asks herself "Why do I want to know?" Once one
selects an interpretive methodology, moreover, space will remain
for play of the imagination. The most for which we reasonably can
hope is that the selected approach will constrain the interpretive
imagination, a point conceded in the field of legal interpretation
even by strongly committed originalists 4 As Mark Tushnet has
pointed out, however, an interpretive rule that says "Always advance the cause of socialism" certainly constrains. 5 The legitimacy
of a rule for interpreting legal texts might therefore begin with the
notion of constraint, but can hardly end there. Thus, the insight
that legal scholars ought to take from the post-structuralist movements in literary criticism is that the interpreter has a responsibility to justify the selected interpretation in terms extrinsic to the
56
interpreted text.

53 A neat, readable introduction to semiotics is Terence Hawkes, Structuralism &
Semiotics (U Cal, 1977). A useful introduction to deconstruction, even if sometimes a bit
harder for the uninitiated to follow, is Harold Bloom, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey H. Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller, Deconstructionand Criticism (Seabury Press, 1979).
For a very different view, see E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (U Chi, 1976).
" See, for example, Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction
of the Law 167-70 (MacMillan, 1989).
11 See Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism,42 Ohio St L J 411
(1981).
56 See Frank Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of the Judiciary,7 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 87, 97 (1984):
A judge cannot expect obedience just because he announces what he thinks a wise and
just result would be. He must always be prepared to give an answer to the question[s]:
Why should other people pay attention? Why is the opinion any more binding than a
law review article?
For an analogous conclusion from a very different starting point, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 Harv
L Rev 781 (1983).
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My claim, therefore, is not that the interpretive method that I
propose is correct in some sense that transcends context, but only
that it lends to adjudication under the Political Constitution a legitimacy that other modes do not.5" I recognize that the will of the
Founders always has about it a somewhat musty, antiquated, even
shabby air, like a quaintly decorated table that is old enough to be
a valuable antique but not sufficiently well preserved. And yet the
single most pertinent fact about an old table is that it has survived: They could build in those days! we tend to say, with some
surprise.
In the popular imagination, the Founders, too, could build,
and what they built, however musty, still survives. If the courts
allow governmental arrangements that run sharply contrary to the
original design, they are in effect drawing upon an allegiance of the
people gained by implying an institutional continuity that does not
exist. This, in turn, amounts to preserving faith through a lack of
candor. But the interpreter inclined to prevaricate must bear in
mind the risk to legitimacy; for subterfuges, as Guido Calabresi has
put it, "are always dangerous, rarely can be intentionally chosen,
and can work only when they are not simply lies."58
De-evolutionary review ties up all of these loose ends. (For
reasons that should now be clear, I am disturbed when I read that
what I have in mind is "originalism" or "formalism"-not that I
consider either one an insult.) In the majority of structural cases, a
de-evolutionary form of review will lead to relatively determinate
answers; that is, different interpreters applying the test in good
faith will tend to reach similar results.5 9 By contrast, what I have

"' See also Schauer, 58 S Cal L Rev at 436-40 (cited in note 36). My Yale colleague Don
Elliott, who considers my argument "circular," see Elliott, 57 Geo Wash L Rev at 507 n 5
(cited in note 13), argues that while I "may be right that literal application of the structural
provisions of the Constitution legitimates judicial review," nevertheless, "it is the wrong
kind of judicial review that gets legitimated." Id at 530. I will let the reader judge whether
my views, whatever their flaws, are circular. As to the rest, I hardly consider my approach a
"literal application" of anything, but assuming that phrase to be a slip of Professor Elliott's
word processor, I will readily concede that reviewing courts might choose from a variety of
approaches-including the creative interpretation that Elliott himself advocates or my own
preference for immersion in the political science of the Founding-but if the newly chosen
method is not tied closely to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, then far
from being the "right kind" of judicial review, it is not judicial review at all. For more on
this point, see Carter, - Wash U L Q - (cited in note 39).
11 Guido Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 116 (Syracuse U, 1985). See
also Alexander M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 92-93 (Yale, 2d ed 1986).
" I should make very clear that I do not conflate determinate results with value-free
adjudication. See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132 U Pa L Rev
445 (1984). I make no claim that the choice for de-evolution in structural cases is value-free
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called the evolutionary approach almost inevitably must lead to
balancing, and hence to indeterminacy.6 0 After all, if the balancing
and policy analysis that the evolutionist prefers provided determinate results, the Congress would more often be unanimous.
The distinction in approach may also lead to a distinction in
results: perhaps unsurprisingly, a search for the original understanding on the structure of government leads to suspicion about
institutional innovations that seem to offend the delicate system of
balanced. and separated powers crafted by the Founders,6 ' whereas
a rule of deference allows the Congress to experiment with entities
and procedures that might be more efficient and more politically
responsive than those envisioned when the Constitution was written and ratified.2 The results obviously matter; the methodology
underlying them matters more. For what is too often forgotten
about the Court's authority is what I mentioned briefly in the introduction: the Court does not only interpret, it also engages in
dialogue. The interpretation is binding, in a way, but the dialogue
is only one side of the conversation. When the Court declines to be
de-evolutionary in construing the Political Constitution-or when,
as seems to be the present case, the Justices cannot even agree on
a theoretical approach-then the Court's side of the conversation
ends up sounding garbled.

or somehow objective. See Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 781-82 (cited in note 14). On the
contrary, even for the committed positivist, no theory of adjudication emerges as an ineluctable consequence of the existence of law. Compare G. Marshall, Positivism, Adjudication,
and Democracy, in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz, eds, Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in
Honour of H.L.A. Hart 132, 138-44 (Clarendon, 1977). Rather, the choice for de-evolutionary review itself furthers specific values, particularly the transcendent and legitimating
value of consistency with the American people's image of how their republic is governed.
(Apologies in advance to my old friend Martha Minow, who finds contextuality, not transcendence, the proper measure of legitimacy. See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73
Telos 79, 97-99 (1987).)
60 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L
J 943, 972-82, 986-92 (1987).
"' See Miller, 1986 S Ct Rev at 52-58 (cited in note 6); Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at
496-500 (cited in note 13).
62 This is what I take to be the burden of my colleague Paul Gewirtz's assertion that
the Constitution "creates living institutions to deal with public affairs in a deliberate, practical, and self-correcting way." Gewirtz, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 354 (cited in note 13).
Gewirtz, I would say, is right in every aspect of this statement except its implications. After
all, if one declines to be de-evolutionary about institutions, it is difficult to see how the
Constitution can be said to "create" them.
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III.

DIALOGUE AND LEGITIMACY

Some years ago, in response to a Supreme Court decision he
greatly disliked, Daniel Patrick Moynihan penned an important essay with the provocative title, What Do You Do When the Supreme Court is Wrong? 63 The question is one that has dogged the
nation since the Founding, for the Court has been wrong often,
sometimes spectacularly so, and occasionally, as in Dred Scott,
with dreadful consequences for the nation. 4
Just about a decade before Moynihan's article, Albert 0.
Hirschman published his deservedly acclaimed monograph, Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty. 5 According to Hirschman, those who are dissatisfied with the performance of any entity, be it a corporation, a
political organization, or government itself, face the choices of
ceasing to patronize or obey (i.e., exit) or complain (i.e., voice). The
dissatisfied are more likely to choose voice, he notes, if they believe
that their complaints will make a difference in the entity's behavior at a relatively low cost to themselves. And a sense of loyalty to
the entity, he adds, should also improve the prospect that the dissatisfied will choose voice.
Hirschman's analysis suggests an answer to Moynihan's question: When the Supreme Court is wrong, its constituents-the public and the public's representatives-are most likely to choose
voice. 6 One reason for this is the widespread public sense that the
entire government is, or should be, politically responsive. (One
might suppose that the Supreme Court stands on a different footing in our political mythos, but for the tendency of the public to
67
take offense when its views are not reflected in the Court's work
and the related phenomenon of the public hoopla about the likely
votes of nominees.) A second, perhaps more important, reason is
loyalty: for the great majority of the American people, exit,
63

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, What Do You Do When the Supreme Court is Wrong?, 57

Pub Int 3 (1979).
61 I pass for the moment the question of what it means to say that the Court is wrong,
although I will, of course, return to it.
65 Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Harvard, 1970).
6 The answer Hirschman predicts is similar to the one Moynihan himself reached, expressed in three neatly rhymed words: debate, litigate, and legislate. Moynihan, 57 Pub Int
at 19-24 (cited in note 63).
17 One particular proponent of this thesis has been Gregory A. Caldeira. See Public
Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-PackingPlan, 81 Am Pol Sci Rev 1139
(1987); and Neither the Purse Nor the Sword. Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 Am Pol Sci Rev 1209 (1986). For a general discussion of the communication of and response to Supreme Court decisions, see Larry Charles Berkson, The Supreme
Court and its Publics (D.C. Heath, 1978).
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whether conceived as physically leaving the country or as openly
defying the courts, is unthinkable.
People are most likely to complain about the Court when they
think it is wrong. They might complain through protest marches,
scathing editorials, the ballot box, or-if they are legally inclined-the pages of the nation's law reviews.6 8 Whatever the people do, they complain; they talk, and hope that the Court gets the
message; and, albeit with some trepidation, they await an answer,
hoping perhaps that even if, as John Updike wrote of Ted Williams, gods do not answer fan mail, it might turn out that demigods answer hate mail.
And why not? The idea of dialogue has an impressive pedigree
in constitutional theory. One may trace it to Thayer, to Lincoln,
and earlier. 9 Alexander Bickel, in trying in the sixties and seventies to cope with the work of the Warren Court, brought the dialogic model into contemporary debate. Ever since Bickel proposed
the metaphor of the courts as interlocutors of the body politic,"0
squads of theorists have argued the wisdom, as well as the limits,
of the Bickelian metaphor. Some commentary has been critical,
some approving; but what all of it has had in common is a sense
that disobedience is at issue. The idea seems to be that when the
courts hand down controversial decisions, they risk loss of scarce
capital in the best case, open defiance in the worst. The image is
one of a court mandating "X," and an aroused populace much preferring "not X."
But the model of dialogue as resting on command and defiance
is too narrow to capture the richness of what Bickel surely envisioned. A dialogue is more than a competition for power; it is, as
Bickel noted in The Morality of Consent, an "endlessly renewed
educational conversation. ' 1 Education need not be limited, on the
one hand, to cases in which the Court must persuade a doubting
public to go along, or, on the other, to cases in which the public
must persuade the Court to change its view. Bickel argued that the
"8As Philip Soper has pointed out, however, there is no reason to think that judges are
impressed by law review critiques. See Philip Soper, A Theory of Law 2 (Harvard, 1984).
Perhaps there is no reason that they should be.
" See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 143-52 (1893), and Lincoln's momentous First Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1861, in James D. Richardson, ed, 8 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3206 (Bureau of National Literature, 1897).
'o See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (cited in note 58) (the first edition of this
book was published in 1962); and Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (Yale,
1975).
7
Bickel, Morality of Consent at 111 (cited in note 70).
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Supreme Court and its public should talk to, not at, each other.
' 72
Education, for Bickel, was "a conversation, not a monologue.
Bickel's archetype was the battle over school desegregation in
the wake of Brown v Board of Education, a battle in which, he
seemed to conclude, the Court and the public had much to learn
from one another. 73 But the school desegregation battle illustrates
only one form of dialogue. There, one sees a Court trying to
awaken dissenting segregationists to the injustice of their cause
while the segregationists themselves tried to persuade the Court
that its ruling was wrong. To understand how narrow a vision of
dialogue this is, turn the clock back six decades before Brown, to
the era of separate-but-equal as enshrined in Plessy v Ferguson.
Under Plessy, the states were free to maintain segregated facilities,
and many did. But some states chose not to. Some states desegregated schools and other institutions voluntarily. Successive presidents desegregated various parts of the executive branch, culminating in Truman's executive order desegregating the armed
forces.74 Whatever their constitutional theories, these desegregators must have disputed the moral philosophy of Plessy.
That, too, represents dialogue-the dialogue that occurs when
the government, far from defying a judicial ruling, declines to go as
far as the ruling permits. The government may hold a power,
whether by clear constitutional language or by judicial decree, and
yet decide not to exercise it for any number of reasons: political
pressures, for example, or judgments about whether a particular
measure, even if desirable, is likely to be effective. Those reasons
are all matters of practical politics. There is, however, another,
more fundamental reason that a government might decline to exercise a power: because it believes that the Court was wrong to grant
it.
The desegregators provide a good example. Even in that earlier age, politicians tended to assume an identity between constitutional meaning and the policies they preferred; so, if the desegregators thought segregation wrong, they very likely thought Plessy

72

Id. One need not be a Bickelian to employ this metaphor. See Paul Brest, Further

Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 Yale L J 1623, 1629
(1988) (footnote omitted) ("Civic republicans must therefore work to re-create a space for
citizens and non-judicial institutions to participate in constitutional discourse and decisionmaking.")
71 Bickel, Morality of Consent at 110-11 (cited in note 70); and Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 244-57 (cited in note 58).
74 Exec Order 9981, 3 CFR § 617.1 (1948).
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wrong as well.7 5 Similarly, in our age many states restrict access to
abortion considerably less than the Supreme Court's decisions allow. The public outcry that greeted the Webster decision 7 6-the
insistence by pro-choice forces that politicians who pressed for new
abortion restrictions would be turned out of office-was designed
as a message to the elected branches of government. Should those
branches take the message to heart, dialogue would be joined with
the Court, too: We do not want this power, the groan would come
back up the Hill to First Street. Take it back, take it back!
As these examples suggest, dialogic models of judicial review
are commonly envisioned as integral to the evolution of the meaning of the open-ended clauses that protect individual rights. Small
wonder, given that the clauses themselves contain so few clues to
their interpretation. 77 Arguments about "originalism" versus "the
living Constitution" provide scant guidance to practical judges who
must decide how the perfectly opaque language of, say, the Due
Process Clause applies to the dismissal of students from public
schools. Despite many clever theories on how they can avoid it,
judges necessarily consult their own moral sentiments in adjudicating cases under the clauses of this Natural Law Constitution.7 8
Naturally, one wants a constitutional theory that constrains the results that those morally sensitive judges might reach; 79 still, although the matter is beyond the scope of this paper, there might
75Nevertheless, some judges of very strong moral convictions struggled to separate, for
example, their views on slavery from the decision on whether and how to enforce the fugitive slave laws. See Robert M. Cover, JusticeAccused: Antislavery and the JudicialProcess
(Yale, 1975).
7' Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 109 S Ct 3040 (1989).
7 The open-ended nature of many of the clauses of the original Bill of Rights strongly
suggests that the Founders themselves might have envisioned a non-originalist judicial role.
For controversial efforts to prove this hypothesis through examination of a sensible
source-the political science of the Founding Generation-see, for example, Thomas C.
Grey, The Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 Stan L Rev 843 (1978); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985); and Sherry, 54 U Chi L Rev 1127 (cited in
note 32).
78 1 do not claim a one-to-one correspondence between a judge's moral position and her
legal position, I only suggest that the vaguer a constitutional clause, the more difficult the
separation of personal values from adjudication. Although there are various ways of addressing this problem, the open-ended clauses of the Natural Law Constitution seem to undermine the pretense that some set of discoverable values can guide adjudication without requiring the judge to make any moral choices. On this point, the Critical Legal Scholars seem
to me to have a very good argument. See, for example, Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights
Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90
Yale L J 1063, 1109 (1981); and Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Ohio St L J 412 (1981).
19 Compare Bork, The Tempting of America at 250 (cited in note 54).
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be something to be said for the proposition that there are cases in
which constitutional judges should engage in self-conscious moral
reflection."0
This of course is hardly a new insight. What has not been
given as much thought as it might deserve, however, is what the
insight entails. The answer is, or ought to be, obvious: constitutional judges forced to take refuge in an assessment of moral truth
should be far less certain of their rightness, and, in consequence,
far more ready to listen to dissenting views, than judges who can
find ways to limit their reliance on individual moral convictions. In
short, constitutional judges who decide cases under the Natural
Law Constitution should welcome the dialogic contribution of
those who disagree with their views."' Rights dialogue is an important and healthy part of the educational conversation, and there is
some reason to think that judges often listen to it."2
What is often unrecognized is that dialogue should be equally
welcome under the relatively more determinate structural clauses
of the Political Constitution." In a sense this might seem counterintuitive, especially if one believes (as I do) that choosing a rule
that yields relatively determinate results is the key to legitimate
interpretation of the Political Constitution, but not necessarily of
the Natural Law Constitution. I have already explained why the
form of cautious originalism that I call de-evolutionary review is
necessary to maintain legitimacy in government structure. Because
judgments about the meaning of the Political Constitution can
thus be made with greater certainty, there is less room for dialogue
concerning their validity.
8o For a defense of this position, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 22-45
(Harvard, 1977). I like the way that Linda Hirshman has phrased the point:
If the Court does not base decisions such as Roe v. Wade in some textual authority
more convincing than the Court used in the opinion, one can defend such decisions
only on the grounds that judges may occasionally impose their personal values of substance in the admittedly undemocratic exercise of judicial review. Two responses were
possible, and each has been tried. One might either attempt to duck the battle by more
securely locating decisions in, for instance, the language of the equal protection clause,
or one could bite the bullet and defend the judge's role as occasional moral arbiter.
Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte, Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of
Judges, 137 U Pa L Rev 177, 183 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
81For a more detailed elucidation of this point, see Stephen L. Carter, The Dissent of
the Governors, 63 Tulane L Rev 1325, 1347-61 (1989).
82 For a thoughtful dissent from the idea that judges should engage in a rights dialogue
with the other branches, see Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5 Const Comm 375 (1988).
83 For an interesting discussion, see Louis Fisher, ConstitutionalDialogues:Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton, 1988), especially chapter 7.
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But less room is not no room. The Court may still err, and the
error may still be clarified through dialectical interchange. The difference between dialogue under the open-ended clauses of the. Natural Law Constitution and dialogue under the structural clauses of
the Political Constitution is that the structural dialogue is subject
to special constraints necessitated by the special nature of judicial
review under the Political Constitution. I have already explained
why judicial review under the structural clauses should be guided
by an understanding of the nature of those clauses. The same understanding that limits selection of interpretive rules also limits
the range of available dialogic responses, and it is in that sense
that the dialogue itself is constrained.
In particular, the "I just don't like this result" form of dialogue that may sometimes (but not always) be an appropriate critique of an interpretation of the Natural Law Constitution is irrelevant under the Political Constitution.8 4 So is the protest that a
85
particular institutional innovation represents good or bad policy,
and Richard Posner's suggestion that the legitimacy of a particular
structural rule be tested by comparing how well other countries
have survived with it or without it.8 What these critiques have in
common is that they accuse the Court of what might be called an
extra-constitutional error; that is, the mistake that the Justices
have made-and that they are called in dialogue to correct-is a
mistake only when measured against a source that is not a part of
the text, structure, or history of the Constitution. But all of them
should be met by the courts with a thundering roar of "Beside the
point!" because none of them can trump the arguments for judicial
enforcement of the science of the Founding Generation. Yet a
court may make other errors in structural cases, and when it does
so, dialogue is often an appropriate means of calling it to account.
The more complex (and perhaps more common) structural
mistake is what might be called "rule application error." This error
occurs when the Court properly strives to be de-evolutionary, but
misunderstands the history, in the sense that the structural vision
8, 1 discuss dialogue under the Natural Law Constitution in Carter, 63 Tulane L Rev at
1347-51 (cited in note 81).
85 E. Donald Elliott has been particularly forceful in urging that the federal courts in
general, and the Supreme Court in particular, adopt a vision of the judge as policymaker in
separation of powers cases. See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha:The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 S Ct Rev 125, 173-76; and Elliott, 57 Geo Wash L Rev at 530-32 (cited in note 13).
88 See Richard A. Posner, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 Const Comm 17,
18 (1988).
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of the Founding Generation points to a different answer than the
one that the Court selects. The more troubling, if more straightforward, structural mistake might be called "rule selection error," and
occurs when the Court selects the wrong interpretive rule. A Court
considering a separation of powers case commits this error by eschewing de-evolution in favor of balancing tests and considerations
of what is generally called public policy.
An example of a decision in which the Justices are often accused of rule application error is Myers v United States,a7 which
held that the Congress could not prohibit the President from removing executive branch officials under certain not fully specified
circumstances. According to some critics, the Court in Myers misunderstood the views of the Founders. 88 (I take no position here on
whether the critics of Myers are right or wrong.) Nowadays, with
originalism so out of fashion in the academy, the Court's structural
opinions are rarely subjected to de-evolutionary critiques. Nevertheless, it is still a fairly simple matter to point out structural
opinions that are styled as legitimating opinions but that are not
de-evolutionary at all, and thus are subject to rule selection error.
In both Morrison and Mistretta,for example, the Court essentially
ignored history and, on some points, even eschewed a close reading
of the constitutional text.
Unlike the possible error that the Justices may commit when
forced to make direct moral choices in order to decide some cases
under the Natural Rights Constitution, the errors of rule selection
and rule application go to method, not result. It is difficult to argue
(although some have certainly tried) that judges possess a comparative advantage over legislators in making moral choices; that is
one reason that it is important for judges adjudicating individual
rights cases to listen carefully to dissenting voices, even when the
dissent takes the form of direct defiance.8 e But when judges turn to
structural questions, they have, or ought to have, a considerable
comparative advantage in legal analysis, not least because the constitutional arguments pressed by members of the Congress and by
the President are likely to be colored by desires to gain advantage.
(Notice how, according to whatever administration happens to be
87 272 US 52 (1926).
88 See, for example, Louis

Fisher, The Constitution Between Friends: Congress, the
President, and the Law 64-67 (St. Martin's, 1978); and Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 Cornell L Rev 430,
434-38, 460-64 (1987).
89 See Carter, 63 Tulane L Rev at 1356-59 (cited in note 81).
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in office, every bill that forces the President to do what he is disinclined to, or prevents him from doing what he wants, turns out to
be unconstitutional.) So political actors should pay close attention
to judicial pronouncements on their innovations-which is not the
same as saying that they must always give the courts the final
word.
The courts are not the same as the Court, and different degrees of dialogic deference may be due to each. This distinction
surely motivates Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz in their
quite sensible suggestion that administrative agencies and intermediate appellate courts should be viewed as "participants in a process of national law development in which neither set of actors has
the final say." 90 According to Estreicher and Revesz, the dialogic
relationship between agencies and the intermediate courts, each
brought into the regulatory process by a Congress apt to overrule
either or both at any time, justifies the government's controversial
practice of "intracircuit nonacquiescence"-that is, repeating in
one circuit a legal position already advanced and rejected in another. Intracircuit nonacquiescence should have a considerable appeal to the advocate of dialogic interchange, for it keeps open the
conversation on statutory interpretation in the same way that
other dialogues may keep open the conversation on constitutional
interpretation.9 1
IV.

LEGITIMATING OPINIONS

Liberal political theory is a story about constraining the form
of popular rule known as democracy. It does this by specifying a
set of principles that the mob-in-parliament-that is, the elected
government-cannot violate. Traditionally, these principles have
entailed specific processes through which the government's public,
the demos, can work its will. Legitimate exercises of authority,
then, are limited as an initial matter to those that follow the correct procedures. In addition, the principles of liberal theory (espe"oSamuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 Yale L J 831, 831 (1990).
" For a sense of the debate, in addition to the Estreicher and Revesz article cited in
note 90, compare Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L J 679 (1989), with Matthew Diller and Nancy
Morawetz, IntracircuitNonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicherand Revesz, 99 Yale L J 801 (1990). See generally Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum
L Rev 452 (1989).
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cially in its contemporary incarnations) entail a set of rights on
which the government is not permitted to trample.
Constitutional theory lies at the intersection of liberal political
theory and the liberal theory of law. Constitutional theory governs
constitutional interpretation and, therefore, ultimately controls the
structure of government, the arena in which politics is played out.
This point is vital to an understanding of the nature of what I call
constitutionally improper government actions. In our ordinary image of politics, the government acts through will and is determined
to accomplish its ends through any means that the courts are likely
to sustain. Put otherwise, the only argument that might sway a
resolute majority is the claim that the majority's preference is unconstitutional. That argument, if convincingly put, should slow the
majority and perhaps even stop it in its tracks, a sensible metaphor since putting the brakes on majority rule is precisely what a
written Constitution is for. 2
This model is of course too simple. Constitutional courts exist
not merely to say to the majority, "No, you may not." Sometimes-much more often, in fact-the courts instead say to the
majority, "Yes, you may." In The People and the Court, one of the
masterworks of constitutional scholarship, Charles Black calls the
signaling of approval the "legitimating function" of judicial review.9 3 By playing this legitimating role, courts reassure the populace that it is indeed being governed in accordance with the forms
of constitutional law. Says Black:
I think the legitimating function of the Supreme Court is one
of immense-perhaps vital-importance to the nation. I do
not see how a government of limited powers could live without
developing some agency for performing this function. The Supreme Court has actually attained acceptance in this role, in
satisfactory measure. To devise another structurally plausible
way of getting this job done would be an immensely difficult
task, and to bring about its actual acceptance would be not
only difficult but quite chancy. 9
A government of limited powers could scarcely exist without a legitimating institution, and Black is surely correct to suggest that
the Supreme Court has "attained acceptance" in its role as legitimator. Whatever was true at the time of the Founding, the wide92 See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch at 16-21 (cited in note 58).
'

See Black, The People and the Court at 56-86 (cited in note 3).
Id at 66-67.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:357

spread expectation as we near the end of the twentieth century is
that disputes over constitutionality are referred to the federal
courts, where the Supreme Court has the final word: final in the
sense that there is no appeal, and final in the sense that it cannot
be disobeyed. 5
The legitimating function, then, in addition to its structural
importance, necessarily involves the exercise of power. To say that
the Supreme Court of the United States has legitimated the contemporary model of independent administrative government is to
make not only a legal statement but a political one as well. The
effect of the statement is to disarm opponents of broadly delegated
power who wish to rest their opposition on constitutional grounds
instead of assailing the wisdom of particular policy choices. "But
the Court has decided the question," the supporter of a new and
expansive delegation can say, and that is the end of the matter.
Whether that ought to be the end of the matter is an interesting and important inquiry to which I will turn my attention in a
few pages. First, however, it is useful to ponder further the question of what makes an opinion a legitimating one. Or, to put the
point another way, when the supporter of a policy says, "But the
Court has decided the question," is it enough that the decision has
been made, or do the arguments pressed in support of the decision
also matter?
The modern view, of course, is that judicial review is entirely
a story of power: that the courts can, in essence, rule on whatever
grounds they please, and the people simply will (or should) obey., 6
Constitutional law is like law of any other kind: one knows what
the law is because an authoritative decisionmaker has said so.9 An
approach of this nature, however, strips judicial review of every attribute that differentiates the work of the courts from the work of
the legislatures. I am reminded of what John Ely has said about
Roe v Wade: the problem is not that it is bad constitutional law,
but that it is not constitutional law in any recognizable sense.98
Putting to one side the question whether Ely's criticism is fair with
11 The ability of the Supreme Court to command obedience may be related to its success in identifying trends in public opinion, particularly on issues relating to individual
rights. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial DecisionMaking in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J Politics 652 (1985).
16For a somewhat overargued statement of this proposition, see Bork, The Tempting
of America at 351 (cited in note 54).
* Compare Fiss, 34 Stan L Rev at 755-58 (cited in note 26).
98 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L J
920, 935-37 (1973).
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respect to that particular case, it plainly carries rhetorical power,
and the power must stem from a sense that there are ways in
which courts, as against other branches of government, are expected to act.9 9
In general, constitutional decisions that are closely tied to the
text, structure, and history of the Constitution are more deserving
of respect than those that are not. In the particular case of adjudication under the relatively determinate structural clauses of the
Political Constitution, the highest degree of respect should be accorded those decisions that fall within the de-evolutionary tradition. If the Supreme Court, reasoning in a de-evolutionary manner,
prohibits a particular institutional innovation on constitutional
grounds, the Congress and the President should be reluctant to
press it; and if they do so, they must recognize that unless they are
able to make a persuasive case for rule application error, they are
acting lawlessly.
At what might be called the opposite extreme were it not so
disturbingly common, the Court issues a decision allowing a particular innovation but couches its opinion in the evolutionary language of efficacy or efficiency or deference to congressional policy
choices. Facing a decision of this kind, a political actor betrays no
disrespect for legal process if she nevertheless questions the constitutional warrant for the innovation. So while the political branches
should be reluctant to force on the Court an institution that has
been declared unconstitutional on de-evolutionary grounds, they
should show no similar reluctance in refusing, on explicitly constitutional grounds, to create an institution that the Court has approved in an opinion lacking adequate de-evolutionary explanation.
This idea should hardly be shocking. It isn't even new. Professor Black, in his discussion of the Supreme Court's legitimating
function, points out that while McCulloch v Maryland might be
said to have answered the constitutional question that had dogged
the Bank of the United States since its inception, the political reality was more complex.' 00 President Andrew Jackson vetoed the
rechartering of the Bank in 1832. In his veto message, says Black,
Jackson "attacked the theory that the decision of the Court was
binding on him in his legislative function of approving or disap-

99 For an insightful presentation of the claim that acting like a court does not necessarily entail obedience to law in the positivist sense, see Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts
Obey the Law?, 77 Georgetown L J 113 (1988).
100 Black, The People and the Court at 81 (cited in note 3).
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proving bills passed by Congress."''1 1 As Black points out, this is
hardly an astonishing proposition, if one believes (as Black does,
and as I do) that "the President can veto for any reason that appeals to him."' 102
However, a study of the veto message suggests that there was
more to Jackson's position than a belief that he, as President, possessed the freedom to act as he chose in his legislative capacity.
The message was an attack on McCulloch itself. According to
Jackson, the Bank possessed powers that were "unauthorized by
the Constitution, subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people. 10 3 True, wrote Jackson, the
Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of a Bank of
the United States, but not every constitutional question raised by
the rechartering of the Bank had been present in McCulloch.04
Besides, he argued, even if the opinion in McCulloch had "covered
the whole ground" of the new Bank, "it ought not to control the
co-ordinate authorities of this Government.' 0 5 Why not? Because
[t]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on
that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not therefore be permitted to
control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their
legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the
force of their reasoning may deserve. 0 6
This well-known passage might easily be misread to support
the notion that President Jackson counseled executive defiance of
the Court when the Court is unpersuasive in its reasoning. In light
of what I have said previously about the importance of the reason101 Id.

'02Id. For a general discussion of the veto power, including grounds cited by the Presidents for its exercise over the years, see Chester James Antieau, The Executive Veto (Oceana, 1988).
103 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, reprinted in Veto Messages of the
Presidentsof the United States, S Misc Doc 49-53, 49th Cong, 2d Sess 88 (1886) ("Jackson
Veto Message").
104 Id at 93-94. Among the aspects of the Bank to which Jackson objected on constitutional grounds and which, he said, the Court did not consider in McCulloch, were the delegation of the congressional power to regulate the currency, see id at 98, and an interference
with the state taxing power, see id at 98-100. He also argued that although the constitutionality of the Bank was supported in part by its location within the executive branch, the
executive "neither needs nor wants an agent clothed with such powers and favored by such
exemptions." Id at 101.
'0' Id at 94.
106 Id.
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ing of structural opinions, the notion is one with which I am obviously sympathetic. But in its context, that isn't what the passage
says at all. Jackson is not suggesting the enactment of legislation
that the Court is likely to strike down. He is suggesting that the
Congress refrain from passing and the President refrain from
signing legislation that the Court is likely to sustain-if, in the
judgment of the political branches, the legislation is nevertheless
contrary to the Constitution. That was the point of the defense of
the veto message later offered by Roger B. Taney, who actually
wrote it.10 7 It is also the only sensible construction of the point
that Jackson makes two paragraphs later when, after noting the
reliance of McCulloch on the Necessary and Proper Clause, he
adds:
Without commenting on the general principle affirmed by the
Supreme Court let us examine the details of this act in accordance with the rule of legislative action which they have laid
down. It will be found that many of the powers and privileges
conferred on [the Bank] cannot be supposed necessary for the
purpose for which it is proposed to be created, and are not
therefore means necessary to attain the end in view and con0 8
sequently not justified by the Constitution.'
Thus, Jackson's veto message comes down to the proposition
that the Court's approval of a measure does not bind the President
and the Congress to suppose, when a similar measure later arises,
that no constitutional objections can be raised. In Jackson's view,
then, the legitimating role that Professor Black envisions for the
Court is essentially for public consumption; it assures the people
that all three branches are in accord. But a legitimating opinion by
the Court does just that, and no more-it does not bind or command. No matter what the Court might have concluded in its legitimating opinion, says Jackson, when the issue that provoked it
arises again the political branches are free to oppose the measure
on the ground that it violates the Constitution.
My only quarrel with President Jackson is that, as I have said
before, the reasons adduced by the Supreme Court in its legitimat107

Taney, who would later be Chief Justice, found the brouhaha over Jackson's argu-

ment surprising. "[N]o intelligent man who reads the message can misunderstand the meaning of the President," Taney wrote. "He was speaking of his rights and his duty, when
acting as a part of the Legislative power, and not of his right or duty as an Executive officer." Quoted in Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 763 (Little, Brown, rev ed 1926).
108 Jackson Veto Message at 95 (cited in note 103) (emphasis added).
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ing opinion matter; so do the reasons adduced by opponents who
challenge the measure on constitutional grounds. The bank bill
veto message, insofar as it is a rejection of judicial supremacy in
the strong sense that I have suggested, would have rested on a
more solid foundation had Jackson made plain what aspects of the
reasoning of McCulloch he found unconvincing."0 9 Translated to
our present age, the point would be that a legitimating opinion on
a question of structural constitutional law ought to be cast in explicitly de-evolutionary language. An opinion so crafted would
carry the dialogic weight that Morrison and Mistretta, for example, do not.
If, however, the purported legitimating opinion is not cast in
the language of de-evolution, then it is far less apparent how it can
be said to legitimate anything. True, a judicial decision will still
exist, and proponents of the challenged measure can still respond
to the constitutional claim with the cry, "But the Court has decided the question." The difficulty is that if the "legitimating"
opinion is not tied to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, the opponents might be justified in firing back with, "Yes,
so what?" For the principal uniqueness of judicial review cannot
possibly be that it is final; finality, after all, is a judgment not on
power, but on precedence. Finality is simply the privilege of speakinig last. The uniqueness of the judicial role surely rests instead on
the singular expertise of the courts, and their concomitant responsibility to give reasons-and reasons of a particular sort-to justify
their actions. 1 0
Justice Jackson was wrong to suppose that the Supreme Court
Justices "are infallible only because we are final.""' He should
have said "We are infallible only when we are final." Alexander
Bickel was right in considering the judiciary to be the least dangerous branch, because the Supreme Court speaks last only when the
rest of the government lets it speak last. And the decision of the
rest of the government to let it speak last ought to rest not simply
on the fact that the Court has spoken, but on the authoritative
109 Other critics of McCulloch, however, specified at some length the reasons that, in
their view, the Court had misconstrued or misstated the applicable doctrines. See Warren,
Supreme Court in United States History at 509-10, 514-27 (cited in note 107).
"I See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (U Chicago, 1949); and
Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision (Stanford, 1961). Compare Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509, 544-48 (1988) (defending "presumptive formalism" as
a restriction on judicial freedom). See also Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 202-07
(cited in note 58).
"I Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson concurring in the result).
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grounding of the Court's reasoning. 112 Or, as Philip Kurland has
put the point, since the Court lacks the practical power to impose
its views, "it would do well to be convincing.' ' 113
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPROPRIETIES

American constitutional government in the late twentieth century is amenable in nearly all of its parts to judicial admonition,
correction, and guidance. Put otherwise, almost no clause of the
Constitution has proved too opaque, no corner of the federal bureaucracy too small, no governmental procedure too trivial, to receive judicial scrutiny. We retain a system of balanced and separated powers, but it is not quite the one that the Founders
envisioned; it has become more legalistic, the role of the courts
more intrusive, the system itself more distant from the original
model, in which the political branches parry and thrust (or, in
Roosevelt's metaphor, call the plays) while the courts act as
referees.
The model of elected government as unadorned majority will
supposes that whatever the majority wants to do, it should do, as
long as the courts have found no constitutional violation. But that
model, as I have already shown, is inadequate. Legislators have a
responsibility to make their own assessments of constitutionality
when the courts have been silent. But as President Jackson
pointed out, there is no evident reason that the responsibility
should cease simply because the courts have spoken." 4 Even when
the courts, as final interpreters, have already sustained a new institutional form, the members of the Congress and, after them, the
President, must be mindful of the possibility that the institution is
nevertheless constitutionally improper.
What I call a constitutionally improper government action-or, for short, a constitutional impropriety-is an official act
"' See Easterbrook, 7 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 97-98 (cited in note 56). It is not my
intention in this brief discussion to oversimplify the complex problem of civil disobedience
as a means of dialogue, particularly when the law being disobeyed is a judicial order and the
"person engaging in the civil disobedience" is a government official who finds the reasoning
behind the order unpersuasive. I have addressed the problem in more detail in Carter, 63
Tulane L Rev at 1347-59 (cited in note 81), and I am currently at work on a book-length
treatment of the problem of disobedience by government officials, tentatively entitled The
Dissent of the Governed: A Theory of Constitutional Obligation.
"I Philip B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 95 (U Chicago,
1970).
"I Jackson isn't alone. Brest doesn't believe it either. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 Stan L Rev 585, 589 (1975).
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that a court ought not or does not forbid but that nevertheless is
contrary to the spirit of the document, as reflected in the document's history and in its role in the constitutional story that We
the People of the United States, tell about ourselves. A constitutional impropriety, although not identical in a positivist sense to
an unconstitutional act, is every bit as offensive to the Constitution, and ought therefore to be every bit as troubling to those who
care about constitutionalism.
Many constitutional improprieties involve rights that We the
People (or many of us anyway) might think of as fundamental. For
example, suppose that President Abe nominates Judge Barbara for
a seat on the Supreme Court. Suppose further that Barbara is a
black woman, and that there is in the Senate sufficient racism and
sexism to sway a few key votes against her. (Others oppose her on
what nowadays are unfortunately considered legitimate grounds,
predictions about the way she is likely to vote.) Barbara's nomination is defeated. Once the evidence of improper motivation turns
up (and in this ethics-hungry age, it is difficult to imagine that it
would not) Barbara might sue, arguing that the Senate's action has
violated her rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Not, of course,
the Fourteenth-let's be doctrinally precise!)" 5
Were some Senators motivated by racism or sexism, their
votes would be morally inexcusable, but that does not mean that a
constitutional claim would exist." 6 On the contrary, a judicial decision holding Barbara entitled to her commission because of the
grounds on which the votes were cast, while magnificent political
theater, would be terrible constitutional law." 7 If there is in our
separation of powers jurisprudence a place for the political question doctrine, it is surely in the process of nomination and
confirmation.""
See Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954).
,,

See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 NYU L Rev 353 (1981) (ar-

guing that the Constitution "guarantees only representative democracy, not perfect government," id at 396).
117 In this sense, I trust that Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803), a structural case, is
fully distinguishable.
"8 See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, - Nw U L Rev (forthcoming, 1990). I have elsewhere argued that two rules should govern the application of
the political question doctrine in separation of powers cases. First, the courts ought to declare a question political if a review of the relevant history convinces them that judicial
interference with another department's discretion would be contrary to the original design.
Second, the courts ought to declare a structural question a political one if they are unable to
find an answer that can be justified in de-evolutionary terms. See Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev
at 800-08 (cited in note 14).

1990]

ConstitutionalImproprieties

And if, Barbara loses her lawsuit because of the political question doctrine it naturally follows that the Senate possesses the raw
constitutional power to reject a nominee on racist and sexist
grounds. 119 To say that the power exists is not, however, to say
that the power ought to be exercised. On the contrary, to oppose a
nominee because of her sex or race cuts against the grain of twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence, or, to put the matter in
somewhat loftier terms, it runs counter to the spirit of the Constitution. And for that reason, a senator contemplating a vote on racist or sexist grounds ought to refrain, even though no court would
or should interfere (and even if-who knows?-the senator's constituents might actually applaud the vote). The senator's vote
might be constitutionally permissible, but it nevertheless would be
constitutionally improper.
The notion of constitutionally improper actions flows from the
familiar propositions that the Constitution equally binds all
branches of federal government and that each branch necessarily
carries a part of the interpretive burden. We cannot consult the
courts constantly, on all details of governance, and it would mark
the failure of our republic were we to try. As Paul Brest has
pointed out, the idea of judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation is profoundly undemocratic:
The practice of judicial review is sometimes said to relieve Congress of the obligation to determine the constitutionality of its enactments. But nothing in Marbury implies that
only the courts can interpret the Constitution. Indeed, Marbury's reliance on the Constitution as supreme law, paramount to ordinary legislation, suggests how absurd the notion
of judicial exclusivity is: To suggest that Congress need not
consult the supreme law of the land is analogous to asserting
that individual citizens need not consult the law before they
act. To be sure, citizens sometimes break the law, subject only
to the risk of sanctions if they are caught. But it would be
perverse to take this to mean that they are not obligated to
obey the law. Much as the income tax system depends on citizens' honesty and voluntary compliance, constitutional de-

"" Efforts to make less than this of the political question doctrine have not generally
succeeded. For a tidy refutation of most of them, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale L J 597 (1976). But see Goldwater v Carter,444 US 996, 100205 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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mocracy requires legislators to abide by the Constitution, even
12 0
if they will not be caught and punished if they disobey it.
The distinction between the general idea of a legislative obligation
to make assessments of constitutionality and the concept of constitutional improprieties lies in the idea that an enactment may offend the legislator's sense of the spirit of the Constitution without
being considered, in a positivist sense, unconstitutional.
My call for legislators to uncover the spirit of the Constitution
should not be taken to suggest that I imagine it an easy matter to
determine, in a positivist way, what the spirit of the Constitution
is. But doing so is nevertheless a legislative responsibility, one that
falls at all times upon the Congress, and one that falls upon the
President when he acts in a legislative capacity. Besides, assessing
the spirit of the Constitution might not be- as difficult as it appears. The story of President Abe and his nomination of Judge
Barbara provides one example, but the fundamental rights field is
readily mined for others.
Consider, for example, Justice Douglas's majority opinion in
Griswold v Connecticut,2 ' a decision occasionally criticized as
lacking constitutional moorings. According to Justice Douglas, a
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" may be found in
"penumbras, formed by emanations from" the "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights.' 1 22 According to the critics, this is not an
acceptable form of constitutional interpretation. I do not choose to
enter that argument here; I would suggest, however, that the criticism, if it carries any validity at all, is properly directed only at
judicial interpreters. Justice Douglas's opinion exemplifies reasoning about the spirit of the Constitution, and in that sense represents precisely what legislators ought to do. Thus even were Griswold one day reversed, a constitutionally sensitive legislator might
well decide that legislative restrictions on birth control technology
are constitutionally improper.
Still, in an era when the federal courts (and, for that matter,
the news media) tend to patrol the borders of fundamental rights
with some care, it is not likely that many government officials will
be faced with a choice quite so stark as in the example of the racist
senator's response to Abe's nomination of Barbara. 1 23 The example
120

Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter

Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga L Rev 57, 63 (1986) (footnote omitted).
...381 US 479 (1965).
122 Id at 484.
123 This has quite recently in our history not been true, and indeed, but for the tone of
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may even seem somewhat implausible, and if it does, the reason
may be precisely that the vote against Barbara would be constitutionally improper. Some constitutional improprieties strike at the
heart of the American mythos, and in an era when moral and legal
judgments so often seem to mix, it is quite natural that most
Americans would quail at the thought that their representatives
might act in ways that our continuing constitutional story teaches
are wrong. More plausible, surely, is the possibility that the Congress (and perhaps the President) will take advantage of a series of
broadly worded opinions of the Supreme Court to alter the structure of the federal government, and with it, the system of checks
and balances that is designed to keep that government from becoming tyrannical.1 2 4
The idea of a structural impropriety might seem a bit startling. After all, when most Americans think about their constitutional rights at all, they tend to think in terms of what they are
free to do without government interference. The idea of a constitutional right to a particular government structure is not nearly as
deeply ingrained in the American constitutional ethos. Just like a
fundamental rights decision, a structural decision can run against
the grain of the Constitution's spirit. The principal distinction is
that although the Natural Law Constitution might have an evolutionary component (a question, I repeat, that is beyond the scope
of this article), the Political Constitution should not. The spirit of
the Political Constitution is the spirit of 1787; it is the liberty implied in the structure of government, not the specific rights secured
against government abuse, that provides the continuity between
the Founding generation and our own. If there is no continuity,
then the claim of constitutional government is in the most important sense a big lie; what exists in its stead is a set of institutions
without warrant in anything except the will of all three branches of
the federal government. And if that is the way the world is to
work-if the structural design of the Political Constitution is to be

the battle over the Bork nomination, I would venture to suggest that nothing other than
racism could adequately explain the vehemence and personal character of many of the attacks on Thurgood Marshall when he was nominated as an Associate Justice in 1967. For
my comparison of the Bork and Marshall confirmation hearings, see Carter, - Nw U L Rev
at - (cited in note 118).
124 Separation of powers and checks and balances were historically very different concepts. See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 33 (Clarendon,
1967). Part of the political science of the Founding was the combination of the two ideas in
a system of balanced and separated powers. See Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 771-78 (cited in
note 14).
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treated not as binding law but rather as a suggestion of a possible
arrangement of government institutions-then one might also ask
what source provides legitimacy for the three branches themselves.
This, surely, is the point, as well as the force, of Justice
Scalia's insistence in Mistretta that the Congress could not simply
delegate all of its legislative authority to the President and then
adjourn. 1 25 The reason that the Congress cannot do so has nothing
to do with the best way of making public policy or deference to
congressional judgment. On the contrary, the President might
prove the more politically responsive decisionmaker,'12 and he can
certainly act with greater dispatch than the Congress. And as to
deference, presumably if the Congress did it, the Congress meant
to do it.12 The reason must be a structural, de-evolutionary one:
this isn't the way the system was designed to function. The delegation of all legislative authority would be a constitutional wrong,
and no "legitimating" opinion of the Supreme Court could make it
into a constitutional right.
John Ely has suggested that "it can only deform our constitutional jurisprudence to tailor it to laws that couldn't be enacted," 2 a conclusion that would mean, in this case, that Justice
Scalia's hypothetical is a non sequitur. I am not so sure that Ely is
right, but his normative claim can, for present purposes, be placed
to one side. The difficulty is with the positive claim, the assertion
that there are statutes (particularly structural ones) that could
never be enacted. As Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out, for example, whatever the Founders might have thought of independent
entities exercising executive functions, they probably did not expect sweeping delegation of legislative authority129-but it has
happened anyway. And as to Justice Scalia's hypothetical, is it unreasonable to imagine the Civil War Congress doing exactly what
he supposes, delegating all of its authority to Lincoln? One might
even argue that by implication, that is exactly what the Congress
did.
The smaller delegations that are a part of the everyday life of
the administrative state differ from these examples only in degree,
not in kind; the Supreme Court, as authoritative constitutional in25
126

Mistretta, 109 S Ct at 677 (Scalia dissenting).
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political

Decisions, 1 J L Econ & Org 81 (1985).
127 See US Railroad Retirement Board v Fritz, 449 US 166 (1980).
12 Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 183 (cited in note 34).
129 See Chemerinsky, 103 Harv L Rev at 53 (cited in note 17). See also Miller, 1986 S Ct
Rev at 54-55 (cited in note 6).
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terpreter and participant in constitutional dialogue, has the responsibility sooner or later to subject these independent entities to
the same de-evolutionary rigor that other innovations, such as the
legislative veto, have undergone. To do less fails to legitimate
them, creating instead a constitutional climate in which "So
what?" is an entirely adequate response to the Court's "legitimating" opinions.
It is no answer to a separation of powers challenge to independent agencies to say, as the Justices are fond of saying, that the
Founders never intended a "hermetic seal" to divide the
branches. 130 The fact that the Founders might have expected some
degree of overlap among the branches does not imply that every
overlap is acceptable. 131 The legislative veto cannot be made constitutional on the ground that the Founders expected some degree
of intermingling of legislative and executive functions: one must
still ask whether this intermingling is consistent with the original
design. The same is true of Justice Scalia's hypothetical decision
by the Congress to delegate all its authority to the President and
then adjourn. Both would be structural wrongs.
The force of Justice Scalia's example comes in its recognition
that what the government tries to do to private individuals is not
all that matters. In fashioning a system of balanced and separated
powers, the Founders understood that how the government does
what it does matters too.'2 Tyrannical governments tend to intermingle and concentrate powers that ought to be separate. Such
governments are without the checks and balances inherent in a
separation of powers, and that lack of checks on the exercise of
authority is what makes "dictator" a dirty word.
The correct answer to Justice Scalia's hypothetical has to be
that a member of the Congress, no matter what judicial opinions
130 The "hermetic seal" language is from Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 121 (1976) (per
curiam), in which, among other things, the Justices struck down on separation of powers
grounds a provision permitting the congressional leadership to appoint some of the members
of the Federal Elections Commission. See also Industrial Union Dept. v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring); INS v Chadha, 462 US at
951 (White dissenting); Bowsher v Synar, 478 US at 714, 718 (Stevens concurring).
13, See Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 765-800 (cited in note 14); Krent, 74 Va L Rev at
1258-72 (cited in note 14); and Shane, 30 Wm & Mary L Rev at 379-81 (cited in note 49).
131 This is the flaw in the otherwise fascinating separation proposal put forth by Jesse
Choper, under which the federal courts would essentially dismiss as political any constitutional questions raised about the allocation of authority between the President and the Congress. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National PoliticalProcess 260-379 (U
Chi, 1980). For my more detailed response to Choper, see Carter, 1987 BYU L Rev at 803-08
(cited in note 14).
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might exist and no matter what her views on the wisdom of assigning all legislative authority to the President, should feel free to
say "I will vote against this delegation, even if a court has held it
to be constitutional, because it is constitutionally improper." And
for cases short of the hypothetical-radical restructurings of the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches, delegations of substantial but finite amounts of power, and the
like-the freedom must be the same. A legitimating judicial opinion should not stand in the way of a legislator's judgment that the
act in question represents a constitutional impropriety.
And a conscientious legislator, as much as a court, can look for
guidance to the-de-evolutionary tradition, because the legitimacy
implied in its reflection of American political iconography is as important to legislative as to judicial governance.
VI.

DIALOGUE, PROPRIETY, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

What has all this to say about administrative government?
Just this: it is not enough that the Congress sees advantages to a
particular agency design, the President agrees, and the courts are
willing to defer to political judgment. There is another question
that all these actors must consider before the aura of legitimacy is
bestowed upon the new design: whether the design is contrary to
the spirit and history of the Constitution; that is, whether it is constitutionally improper.
Administrative agencies, entities independent of the direct
control of either the President or Congress, have an impressive
positivist pedigree: the courts have sustained them against nearly
every important challenge. But for reasons that I have explained,
the opinions sustaining them must be subjected to de-evolutionary
scrutiny to determine whether or not they may be regarded as authoritatively legitimating. It turns out that none of the three decisions that can be said to establish the modern independence of the
agencies-Humphrey's Executor, Morrison, or Mistretta-is writ-

ten in a way that anchors the result firmly in text, structure, or
history. In that sense, it can fairly be said that the Supreme Court
has never handed down a truly legitimating opinion on the constitutional propriety of the independent agencies. For that reason,
legislators and Presidents would be perfectly justified in treating
the independence of the agencies as a constitutional impropriety.
The Reagan Administration could hardly have been happy
with its going-away present from the Supreme Court, the decision
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in Mistretta v United States.133 In Mistretta, the Justices voted 8
to 1 to sustain the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent agency, ostensibly "in" the judicial branch, which issues guidelines that limit the sentencing discretion of federal judges. Since sentencing guidelines that bind
seem legislative in character, and since the members of the Sentencing Commission are not under legislative or executive control,
one conclusion that can be drawn from Mistretta is that the current Supreme Court is untroubled by delegations of legislative authority to essentially independent entities.
The Reagan Administration had argued to the Court that the
power to issue sentencing guidelines, if not exercised by the Congress itself, had to be lodged in the executive branch. This claim,
although rejected by the majority with the terse and somewhat
mysterious observation that the power to set rules "becomes an executive function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch,"'" 4 has a surface plausibility. Cass Sunstein has
summarized the case for centralizing delegated power in the executive branch as resting on three factors: first, that the President is
electorally accountable; second, that "[t]he President's institutional position is useful for coordinating the wide range of sometimes inconsistent legislation of the modern regulatory state"; and,
third, that the President is able "to energize and to direct regulatory policy in a way that would be difficult or impossible if that
policy were set individually by agency officials."' 3 5 These arguments, while of obvious policy-analytic appeal, of course carry no
de-evolutionary weight. (A possible exception is the first, which
might be recast as a reflection of the Founders' concern that political decisions be made by electorally accountable decisionmakers.)
Another possible basis for the Reagan position is an argument
from constitutional language and structure. The first sentence of
Article II, vesting in the President "All" executive authority, is the
obvious place to start. The "take care" clause is a useful addition.
How, after all, can the President take care that the executive
power vested in him by the Constitution be faithfully executed if
he is unable to control those in whom the Congress chooses to vest
it? But that argument, for all that it might say about the transfer
of executive authority to independent entities, says nothing about
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the delegation of legislative authority; after all, making the laws is
not the same function as seeing that they are faithfully executed.
One might of course go to the history, of which there is a
bit,1 36 or one might finally go to the structure. One might argue, for
example, that even if the contours of congressional power to assign
legislative or executive authority to an independent entity are unclear, matters are different when the Congress and the President
have agreed on an allocation of legislative authority into the executive branch, and a wise and sensitive Supreme Court will disturb
the allocation at its peril. After all, did not the Founders expect
the executive to act with energy and dispatch when the legislature
could not? Did not Justice Jackson, in his famous concurrence in
the Steel Seizure Case, point out that when the Congress has authorized the President to act as he has, "his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate"? 137 And did not the Supreme
Court, in Dames & Moore v Regan,13 adopt Justice Jackson's theory as a principle of adjudication in separation of powers cases?
Actually, this argument proves very little, as pointed out by
my colleague E. Donald Elliott. Justice Jackson's approach, according to Elliott, "comes down to telling us that when the President acts with Congress behind him, he has more power than when
he doesn't."'' 9 The Jackson formulation, moreover, gives no clue
about which congressional delegations should be sustained and
which should not. Justice Jackson warns against striking down
presidential actions under congressional authority, because to do
so "usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power."140 That claim, however, is a terribly unpersuasive one, at least to the de-evolutionist. The federal government as
an undivided whole possesses a good many powers, but not all of
them can be exercised by the President, even with the concurrence
of the Congress.
Justice Jackson's Steel Seizure opinion-although magnificent
in many places-is thus at its weakest on the point for which it is
cited most often. Certainly it provides no useful support for the
Reagan claim that legislative powers, if delegated at all, must be
136
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delegated to the President. Consequently, while the claim might
perhaps have deserved better treatment than the brief and dismissive footnote that it received from the majority, the Justices were
probably right to reject it. Still, whatever one might think of the
Reagan effort to consolidate rulemaking power in the presidency,
the Supreme Court's deference to congressional policy judgments
in the face of separation of powers arguments ought to be
troubling.
The Court, however, seemed unconcerned about other structural problems with the Commission. In fact, the Justices made the
case look easy. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion explained that
nothing was really different under the Sentencing Commission:
Prior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch, as an
aggregate, decided precisely the questions assigned to the
Commission: what sentence is appropriate to what criminal
conduct under what circumstances. It was the everyday business of judges, taken collectively, to evaluate and weigh the
various aims of sentencing and to apply those aims to the individual cases that came before them. The Sentencing Commission does no more than this ...."'
No wonder, then, that the Court concluded that the legislation
simply "consolidates" in the Commission "the power that had been
exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission to
decide what punishment an offender should suffer.""' 2 This is a bit
like saying that the Constitution simply consolidates in the federal
government the power that had been exercised by the several
states. Both statements mask radical restructurings of the allocation of authority by treating them as mere administrative
conveniences.
In the past, the sentencing formula was so well understood
that it was virtually a truism. The legislative branch decided on
the range of punishment for offenses, the executive branch prosecuted, and the judicial branch imposed the punishment. 4 Now
the Sentencing Commission, an independent agency, decides on
the range, and the judges must do as it tells them. The Mistretta
majority explained that the traditional allocation had not actually
109 S Ct at 666.
Id at 652.
143 For discussions of the accuracy or inaccuracy of this truism, see Shane, 30 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 379-80 (cited in note 49) and Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of The
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 Duke L J 561.
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been changed, because the Commission, although independent, is
"in" the judicial branch.'
That sleight of hand made the case
trivial: the judicial branch sentenced before, the judicial branch
sentences now. Nothing has changed!
As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, however, it isn't clear
what it means to say that the Commission is "in" the judicial
branch.145 The judges do not control it; the Chief Justice does not
appoint its members; it is not answerable to any judicial body. In
fact, the Commission is "in" the judicial branch only in a single
sense-the statute says so. The rule consequently seems to be that
an agency is where the Congress says it is; and the choice of the
best place for the Commission is for the Congress to make.
The message of Mistretta echoed the Court's 7 to 1 decision a
year earlier in Morrison v Olson,146 sustaining the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act providing for
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate allegations
of wrongdoing in the executive branch. I have already written one
lengthy appraisal of Morrison,147 and see no need to repeat myself
here. Suffice it to say that Morrison, like Mistretta, reflected a vision of flexibility in the structural clauses of the Constitution. The
logic of both cases is that the place to search for the constitutional
validity of a new institutional form is not in the system of balanced
and separated powers designed by the Founders, but rather in an
assessment of the public policy rationale put forth on behalf of the
institution under review. In that sense, the judicial function is not
markedly different from the legislative.
Much has been said about the Supreme Court's 1935 decision
Humphrey's Executor v United States, 48 and little need be added
here. In that case, President Roosevelt sought to remove a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, notwithstanding a statutory restriction on the removal power. To the President's claim
that the Commission exercised executive authority, which put it
under the President's control, the Court responded with a casual
"So what?" The Justices said that it was "plain" that nothing in
the Constitution gave the President an "illimitable power of re144
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moval" over leaders of independent agencies.14 To recognize such
a power, the Justices explained tersely, would threaten the Commission's "independence." 15 0
The trouble with all of this is that it places the shoe on the
wrong foot. It should scarcely be surprising that the Constitution
says nothing about the President's power to remove officers made
independent by statute, because the Constitution says nothing
about independent agencies at all. The Court had an answer for
that, too: the congressional authority to establish independent
agencies "cannot well be doubted."' ' 51 A legitimating opinion indeed-except that the Justices barely mentioned the Constitution's text and failed to cite a single scrap of its history.
Humphrey's Executor, in short, may be rightly or wrongly decided,
but the one thing that it is not is an example of the de-evolutionary tradition.
According to Clinton Rossiter, Humphrey's Executor represented one of the Supreme Court's "few spectacular victories over
the President.' 1 2 Possibly that was true in 1956, when Rossiter
wrote; but if a victory occurs whenever the Justices reject a claim
of presidential, authority over independent entities, then it can
fairly be said that the Supreme Court, in Morrison and Mistretta,
has recently won two more.
Maybe victories are really what matter. The trouble with all of
this, however, is that it does not take the separation of powers seriously. There is a sense in which this tendency is easy to understand. We live in an increasingly bureaucratic era, one in which an
activist federal government regulates, and regulates a lot. It is
quite natural in such a world that a legislature, impatient with the
structure of government designed by the Founders, would stumble
down the slippery slope toward delegating large chunks of its authority to quasi-independent agencies.
Perhaps it was inevitable that the Court would yield to the
congressional desire to deploy its authority without regard to the
I'l Id at 629.

150 Id at 630.
"" Id at 629.

152Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency 57 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 2d ed
1960). To put Rossiter's comment in perspective, I should add that he was also of the view
that "[flor most practical purposes, the President may act as if the Supreme Court did not
exist," id at 56, a comment that I take to be less a recognition of raw power than an acknowledgment of what I have already pointed out, that the federal government operates in
most of its functions without the need for judicial activity.
'53 Indeed, this is the entire point of what might be called New Deal constitutionalism.
See Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 422-25 (cited in note 13).
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original design. But the development is hardly one to be celebrated. It might be a little strong to say, as Justice Scalia did in his
Mistretta dissent, that the Court has permitted "the creation of a
new branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress.""'u But
structure matters. The authors of the Constitution understood the
risk of tyranny posed when the powers of government are not separated, and they designed a Constitution to put their political science into practice. Two centuries later, we are on the verge of forgetting their wisdom.
Probably the Justices did not intend to suggest that whatever
the Congress says goes, but the lesson of Morrison and Mistretta
certainly seems to be that we are moving dangerously close to that.
Nothing in either opinion sets out a clear and reliable boundary
between what the Court will permit and what it will not, which
leaves the future rather uncertain. And neither opinion is truly deevolutionary in spirit, which leaves their legitimating force open to
question.
Both Morrison and Mistretta are structural decisions, for both
are about the locus of power. Neither involves an expansion of the
authority of the federal government as a whole; no one denies that
the power to investigate and prosecute executive malfeasance rests
somewhere, nor that the political branches can set sentencing
guidelines binding the judiciary. Each decision, however, involves
what is in effect a reassignment of power from its original holder to
a special individual or agency. In sustaining the reassignments in
those cases, the Supreme Court has implicitly invited the Congress
to continue to experiment with transfers of authority from a constitutionally assigned locus to a legislatively designated one. The
invitation, however, is one that it might be constitutionally improper for the Congress to accept. Like Humphrey's Executor
before them, neither Morrison nor Mistretta really offered much
de-evolutionary analysis in support of their holdings. With the case
for independent administrative government resting on so shaky a
foundation, a wise Congress might still pause and ask itself
whether a fourth branch of government might after all be a constitutional impropriety.
CONCLUSION

De-evolutionary review is the key to legitimacy in adjudication
under the structural clauses of the Political Constitution. But the
161109
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Supreme Court, as it has shown in Mistretta and Morrison, is capable of occasionally forgetting the de-evolutionary lesson that it
has in the past been at such pains to teach. On those occasions,
politicians and bureaucrats who believe that Hamilton and Montesquieu were right, that unchecked power is bad in itself, and who
understand the limitations on their own abilities to judge the extent of their own powers, should resist the temptation to stretch
the limits of constitutional structure as far as the Justices are willing to let them go. They must announce, if only to each other, that
the Court has done wrong, and that to do what the Court would
allow, while perhaps not unconstitutional (given the lack of de-evolutionary analysis, the matter must be considered unsettled), is
contrary to the document's spirit and therefore constitutionally
improper. Thus, they should refuse the path of self-aggrandizement, and force the nation instead to follow the path of constitutionalism, trading the expediency of flexibility for the legitimacy of
limitation.
"Self-restraint," says Professor Black, in closing his discussion
1' 55
of the legitimating function, "is always a paradox, a miracle.'
And he adds: "Behind all other perils lies the only one that really
matters-the people may change their minds, and decide after all
to abandon the idea of self-restraint through law."' 156 That is a
peril in a dynamic and complex society, and the de-evolutionary
tradition provides the means for its avoidance. When the Justices
of the Supreme Court, in their rush to join a dialogue over wise
and sensible policy, discard de-evolutionary interpretation, it is up
to the political branches, unlikely though the idea might sound, to
impose on themselves the restraint that the Court will not.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Morrison and Mistretta represent ringing endorsements of the ideal of independence in the
administrative state. What is fascinating and sad about those opinions, however, is that they neither confront the strongest arguments for non-delegation nor provide analytically interesting
counter-arguments. Consequently, neither Morrison nor Mistretta
carries sufficient dialogic authority (as against interpretive authority) to alter any previously held conviction on the constitutional
status of the agencies. To paraphrase Alexander Bickel, the decisions represent monologue, not conversation.
In this article, I have called upon the Congress and the President to keep alive the dialogue that Morrison and Mistretta
"I"Black,
156
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threaten to foreclose. Until the Court finally confronts in a convincing, coherent, and de-evolutionary way the constitutionality of
the independent agencies, the political branches should not let
matters 'drift further along merely because the Justices refuse to
call a halt. My specific suggestion is that the political branches
avoid accepting what might be termed the reverse binding effect of
a legitimating decision; that is, the President and the Congress
should not assume that simply because the Court has approved a
particular institutional form and there are policy reasons in favor
of its creation, there are no constitutional problems left to be
solved.
In support of my appeal, I have developed a model of what I
call constitutional improprieties, government actions that the
courts are unwilling or unable to prevent but that violate the spirit
of the Constitution nevertheless. Our traditional model of governance supposes that a politician asks herself only two questions:
Will this help me get re-elected? Will the courts sustain it? My
modest proposal is that she also ask a third: "Whatever the courts
may say about it, is this measure in my judgment also consistent
with the spirit of the Constitution that I am sworn to defend?"
I do not contend that politicians who ask themselves this
question will reach the conclusion that administrative government
resting on broad delegations of legislative and executive authority
is constitutionally improper. My argument is simply that they
should ask the question. I do suggest, however, that anyone concerned about limited constitutional government ought to feel at
least a bit uncomfortable about the evidence that the Court has
marshalled in support of its opinions purporting to legitimate various facets of the administrative state. And the more the discomfort
that a reflective politician may feel, the less should be her willingness to assume that the Justices have solved for her the problem of
constitutional propriety.

